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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The effects that are predicted to occur as a result of global climate change have 
the potential to be devastating, effecting food and water security, threatening sensitive 
ecosystems and species, and forcing the relocation of thousands of people.  However, 
little has been done to effectively combat this problem for two primary reasons: there are 
uncertainties surrounding climate change projections and many countries are unwilling to 
accept their fair share of the burden.  This project will attempt to reframe these problems.  
Specifically, I will argue that it is rational for policymakers to act on the model-generated 
predictions of climate change, and (based on the framework that Rawls lays out in The 
Law of Peoples), all peoples have a duty to work towards the abatement of and adaptation 
to climate change. 
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Introduction 
 
  Since the late 1980s, the problem of global climate change has been center stage 
in the international policy arena.  The effects that are predicted to occur as a result of 
global climate change have the potential to be devastating, effecting food and water 
security, threatening sensitive ecosystems and species, and forcing the relocation of 
thousands of people.1   However, as of yet, little has been done that has both effectively 
incorporated all major global players while at the same time promoting the type of action 
that is necessary to combat this problem.  The primary reasons underlying this lack of 
commitment have to do with the uncertainties surrounding climate change  projections 
and the unwillingness of some countries to accept their fair share of the burden.  
Specifically, many policymakers have claimed that any action taken towards abatement 
would be irrational, since there is not yet one-hundred percent certainty surrounding the 
forecasts.  Additionally, some world leaders have argued that they will not commit 
themselves to any treaty that places “too much” of a burden on their country, regardless 
of what is fair.  This project will attempt to offer a new way of looking at these problems.  
Specifically, I will argue that it is rational for policymakers to act on the model-generated 
predictions of climate change, and (based on the framework that Rawls lays out in The 
Law of Peoples), all peoples have a duty to work towards the abatement of and adaptation 
to climate change (as a matter of international morality).  I develop this latter claim by 
drawing on Rawls’s Law of Peoples.    
                                                 
1 Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change, 
Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), Summary for Policymakers. 
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 Chapter I lays out the necessary background information surrounding climate 
change.  Specifically, I address the human contribution to climate change as well as the 
uncertainties intrinsic to climate science and climate change predictions.  Continuing, 
chapter II deals with the issue of uncertainty surrounding climate change predictions.  
Coupling van Fraassen’s concept of empirical adequacy with Douglas’s conception of 
inductive risk, I argue for the rationality of acting on model-generated predictions.  Since 
it is rational to act on the model-generated predictions, Chapter III explores the demands 
of international morality to the problem of climate change.  Specifically, I argue that the 
framework that Rawls details in The Law of Peoples provides a viable option for dealing 
with this problem.  From this framework, it can be shown that all peoples have a duty to 
work towards the abatement of climate change as well as to aid in the adaptation of other 
peoples to the effects of climate change as an extension of their duty to assist.            
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Chapter I – Climate Change and Climate Science  
 
Introduction 
 This chapter seeks to give a brief layout of the scientific ground that currently 
surrounds the climate change debate. Section I gives a quick overview of the importance 
and functioning of the Earth’s atmosphere.  Section II outlines the contribution that 
anthropogenic activities have on global climate change.  Continuing, section III details 
sources of uncertainty in climate science and prediction.  Finally, section V illuminates 
the impacts that climate change is predicted to have and the degrees of certainty 
associated with the predicted impacts, as detailed by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC).   
 
Section I - How the Atmosphere Works   
The Earth’s atmosphere serves three vital functions.  First, it provides those gases 
that are essential to the life-sustaining process on Earth.  Specifically, it provides carbon 
dioxide for photosynthesis, oxygen for respiration, and nitrogen for nitrogen-fixing 
bacteria and plants.   Second, the atmosphere also serves a very important protective 
function - it absorbs life threatening solar radiation, preventing it from reaching the 
surface of the Earth.  Finally, the atmosphere stabilizes the Earth’s temperature by a 
process known as the greenhouse effect.  If the greenhouse effect did not occur, then the 
average surface temperature of the Earth would be around –18oC.2  In this process, water 
vapor and carbon dioxide reabsorb outgoing radiation from the surface and reradiate 
                                                 
2 Stanley E. Manahan, Environmental Chemistry, 6th ed. (Boca Raton, Fl.: Lewis Publishers, 1994), 270. 
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about half of that energy back to the surface, creating a relatively stable temperature of 
15oC. 3  The water molecules in the atmosphere are primarily responsible for most of the 
absorption of infrared radiation. Carbon dioxide, although present in a much lesser 
concentration, also aids in the reabsorption of infrared radiation. This absorption is key in 
maintaining the Earth’s heat balance.  An increase in the concentration of any greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere may lessen heat loss, thereby increasing Earth’s temperature.   
 
Section II - The Anthropogenic Contribution to Climate Change  
 
In 1988, the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations 
Environment Programme jointly established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). This organization was founded with the purposes of assessing “available 
scientific and socioeconomic information on climate change and its impacts on the 
options for mitigating climate change and adapting to it” and “too provide, on request, 
scientific/technical/socioeconomic advice to the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).”4   Recently, the 
IPCC completed their Third Assessment Report (TAR).  Much of this report deals with 
determining the degree that anthropogenic activities have contributed to climate change. 
Indeed, atmospheric variability and climate change occur naturally, oscillating to 
maintain the natural, delicate balance that exists between all the elements of the climate 
system.  However, since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, man has influenced 
this balance by changing the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the Earth’s 
                                                 
3 Manahan, 270. 
4 Working Group II, forward. 
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atmosphere, primarily through the burning of fossil fuels (aerosols, biomass burning, 
land-use change, and deforestation have all contributed, as well).5  Science has confirmed 
that the levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere remained constant for about one 
thousand years before the Industrial Revolution.6  Since then, the concentrations of 
several greenhouse gases have increased in the atmosphere, most notably the 
concentration of carbon dioxide.  There has been a thirty percent increase in the carbon 
dioxide level since pre-industrial times, and this concentration is continuing to increase at 
a rate of .4 percent per year.7  With regards to this observed change, the IPCC writes, 
“We know that this increase is anthropogenic because the changing isotopic composition 
of the atmospheric CO2 [carbon dioxide] betrays the fossil origin of the increase.”8  An 
increase in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere leads to a 
greater amount of radiation that is trapped between the atmosphere and the surface of the 
Earth, thereby increasing the temperature of the Earth’s surface.  In other words, 
                                                 
5 Human induced land-use changes have also been shown to significantly contribute to climate change.  
The term “land-use change” refers to “any change in use or management of the land”. (Working Group I to 
the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: 
The Scientific Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 93.) Changes in the land due to 
agriculture, irrigation, deforestation, reforestation, aforestation, urbanization, and traffic are some of the 
more severe ways in which anthropogenic activities have altered the land. (Working Group I, 93) The TAR 
reports that “land-use change results in changing the physical and biological properties of the land surface 
and thus the climate system.” (Working Group I, 93.) There are two specific ways in which land-use 
changes can affect the global climate system.  First, land-use change can influence the land-atmosphere 
exchanges of radiation, heat, and water.  Second, land-use changes can result in the destruction or alteration 
of vegetation, thus altering terrestrial carbon sinks. (Working Group I, 443) This problem can be 
intensified, as changes in climate can directly affect land-use.  As the concentration of carbon dioxide 
increases in the atmosphere, and the surface temperature of the Earth increases, there will be substantial 
changes in the ways that certain land areas can be used.  For example, agriculture in some regions will 
change.  In some areas it is likely that crop yields and crop types will be altered.  Changes in water 
availability due to climate change will also influence agricultural practices.    
6 Working Group I, 92. 
7 Working Group I, 92. 
8 Working Group I, 92. 
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anthropogenic activities are contributing to higher concentrations of carbon dioxide (and 
other greenhouse gases) in the atmosphere, thus creating an enhanced greenhouse effect.   
  The TAR reports that “the warming over the last 50 years due to anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases can be identified despite uncertainties due to anthropogenic sulfate 
aerosol and natural factors (volcanoes and solar irradiance).”9  Further, “human 
influences will continue to change atmospheric composition throughout the 21st century” 
and “anthropogenic climate change will persist for many centuries.”10   Anthropogenic 
influences on climate change can be identified apart from natural influences in order to 
determine the affect that human activities have on the climate system.  These claims are 
founded on a multitude of detection and attribution studies.11  Through these types of 
studies, new evidence has surfaced that shows that anthropogenic activity has influenced 
the observed trend of global warming, and will continue to influence climate change, 
primarily through the use of fossil fuels and the consequent release of carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere.   By analyzing new reconstructions of temperature over the last 1,000 
                                                 
9 Working Group I, 10. 
10 Working Group I, 12, 17. 
11 Detection is “the process of demonstrating that an observed change is significantly different (in a 
statistical sense) than can be explained by natural variability.” (Working Group I, 55)  Attribution is “the 
processes of establishing cause and effect with some defined level of confidence, including the assessment 
of competing hypotheses.” (Working Group I, 55)  Through detection studies, scientists are able to 
determine whether or not an observed change is statistically unusually.  However, these studies cannot 
pinpoint the cause of the change.  Attribution studies in climate change employ statistical analysis and 
careful examination of evidence to show (within a pre-specified margin of error) that the changes in 
question are: 
1.) unlikely to be due entirely to internal variability; 
2.) consistent with the estimate responses to the given combination of anthropogenic and natural 
forcing; and 
3.) not consistent with alternative, physically plausible explanations of recent climate change that 
exclude important elements of the given combination of forcings.  (Working Group I, 55-56.  
Natural external forcings include, but are not limited to, radiation from the sun or volcanic 
activity.  Anthropogenic external forcing of the climate system includes, but is not limited to, 
burning fossil fuels and deforestation.)  
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years, it was found that the observed temperature changes in the last 100 years are 
“unlikely to be entirely natural in origin, even taking into account the large uncertainties 
(in palaeo-reconstructions).”12  The authors of the TAR write, “even if the models 
underestimate the magnitude of the response to solar or volcanic forcing, the spatial and 
temporal patterns are such that these effects alone cannot explain the observed 
temperature changes over the 20th century.”13  Furthermore, these studies have found that 
a “significant anthropogenic contribution” is needed to account for the changes in surface 
and tropospheric temperature trends over “at least the last thirty years” and “while 
detection in anthropogenic factors is often ambiguous, detection of the influences of 
greenhouse gases on the surface temperature changes over the past 50 years is robust.”14 
To add to the scope of new evidence that shows that human activities are 
contributing to climate change, there is now a broad range of reliable detection 
techniques from which to gather and assess data.  The TAR reports that “the increase in 
the number of studies, breadth of techniques, increased rigor in the assessment of the role 
of anthropogenic forcing in climate, and the robustness of results to the assumptions 
made using those techniques, has increased the confidence in these aspects of detection 
and attribution.”15  Perhaps most importantly, the TAR reports that despite uncertainties, 
there is no question that human activities have contributed to global warming.  The 
                                                 
12 Working Group I, 56. 
13 Working Group I, 57. 
14 Working Group I, 57. 
15 Working Group I, 57. 
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authors write, “uncertainties in other forcings that have been included do not prevent 
identification of the effect of anthropogenic greenhouse gases over the last 50 years.”16 
 
Section III - Sources of Uncertainty  
The authors of the TAR acknowledge and assess the uncertainties that are 
inherent in climate science.  In this report, the authors address the uncertainties of climate 
science and the impacts that they have on the likelihood of their future projections.   The 
TAR cites three main categories of sources of uncertainties: problems with data, 
problems with models, and other sources of uncertainties.17  Problems with data include, 
but are not limited to: 
1.) Missing components or errors in the data 
2.) “Noise” in data associated with biased or incomplete observations 
3.) Random sampling error and biases (nonrepresentativeness) in a 
sample.18 
 
Problems with models include, but are not limited to: 
 
1.) Known processes but unknown functional relationships or errors in 
structure of model 
2.) Known structure but unknown or erroneous values of some important 
parameters 
3.) Known historical data and model structure but reasons to believe 
parameters or model structure will change over time 
4.) Uncertainty regarding predictability (e.g., chaotic or stochastic 
behavior) of system or effect 
5.) Uncertainties introduced by approximation techniques used to solve a 
set of equations that characterize the model.19 
 
Finally, other sources of uncertainty include, but are not limited to: 
 
1.) Ambiguously defined concepts and terminology 
                                                 
16 Working Group I, 59. 
17 Working Group II, 127. 
18 Working Group II, 127. 
19 Working Group II, 127. 
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2.) Inappropriate spatial/temporal units 
3.) Inappropriateness of/lack of confidence in underlying assumptions 
4.) Uncertainty resulting from projections of human behavior (e.g., future 
consumption patterns or technological change), as distinct from 
uncertainty resulting from “natural” sources (e.g., climate sensitivity, 
chaos).20 
The projections of the impacts of future climate change made by the IPCC are made with 
these uncertainties in mind.  Additionally, each projection is categorized by its degree of 
uncertainty.   
 
 Section IV - Impacts of Climate Change and Degrees of Certainty 
  Given the uncertainties in both the science of climate change and in the 
projections that climate scientists make, the authors of the TAR attempt to employ a 
“unified approach for assessing, characterizing, and reporting uncertainties in the 
TAR.”21  The importance of recognizing and characterizing uncertainty is expressed by 
Moss and Schneider.  They write; 
One of the major challenges in preparing the IPCC Third Assessment 
Report (TAR) is that authors will need to present a clear snapshot of 
information on climate change, potential impacts, and response options, 
when the extent of that we know is continuously evolving.  Given the 
needs of decision-makers to weigh potential responses to the risks of 
climate change before all uncertainties can be resolves, the available 
information, imperfect as it may be, must be synthesized, evaluated, and 
presented in a responsible and informative manner.  To do this, lead 
authors will be reviewing the published literature, documenting the ranges 
and distributions of findings and estimates in the literature, assessing the 
scientific merit of this information, and explicitly distinguishing and 
communicating which findings are well understood, which are somewhat 
understood, and which are speculative.  In short, assessment of the relative 
credibility of a variety of processes and outcomes is a major goal of the 
Reports.22  
                                                 
20 Working Group II, 127. 
21  Working Group II, 80. 
22 R. Moss and S. Schneider, “Uncertainties in the IPCC TAR: recommendations to lead authors for more 
consistent assessment and reporting,” in Guidance Papers on the Cross Cutting Issues of the Third 
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  In an effort to promote consistency, confidence schemes and qualitative terms were 
developed and utilized to assess and communicate the scientific merit of the information 
presented. 
  The degrees of uncertainty presented in Working Group II are based on a 
Bayesian probability framework.  Within this framework, “the probability of an event is 
the degree of belief that exists among lead authors and reviewers that the event will 
occur, given observations, modeling results, and theory currently available.”23   
Expressed on a quantitative scale, there are five levels within this scheme that are used to 
categorize degrees of uncertainty; these levels are very high confidence level, high 
confidence level, medium confidence level, low confidence level, and very low 
confidence level.24   Additionally, there is an optional second scale that could be used to 
supplement the quantitative scale if the authors deemed necessary; this second method 
employed is Bayseian as well, but is qualitative, rather than quantitative.  It exists as a 
supplement, and not an alternative, because the terms do not map well onto a quantitative 
scale, thus increasing the possibility for inconsistent usage; it was used only in those 
instances when a writing team felt the need to explain why it assigned the confidence 
                                                                                                                                                 
Assessment Report of the IPCC, ed. R. Pachauri, T. Taniguchi, and K. Tanaka (Geneva: World 
Meteorological Association, 2000), 34. 
23 Working Group II, 79.  
24 Working Group II, 79. 
 5-Point Qualitative Scale for Confidence Levels 
1.  95% or greater is a very high confidence level 
2.  67-95% is a high confidence level 
3.  33-67% is a medium confidence level 
4.  5-33% is a low confidence level 
5.  5% or less is a very low confidence level 
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level that it did.25    It assesses and reports on the “quality or level of scientific 
understanding that supports a given conclusion” based on evidence and agreement among 
experts.26  Within this method, there are four “state of knowledge” descriptors; these 
descriptors are well-established knowledge, established but incomplete knowledge, 
competing explanations, and speculative knowledge.27  While the five point scale was 
recommended for all working groups to the third assessment report, working Group I 
adopted a separate, seven point scale (also Bayseian) to express judgmental degrees of 
confidence.  This was done primarily because authors in Working Group I disagreed with 
the recommended wording; “Decisions to adopt a 7-level scale for describing likelihood 
were taken primarily to introduce a descriptor for a very high level of likelihood 
expressing results from observational studies involving large amounts of information.”28  
                                                 
25 Moss and Schneider,  44. 
26 Working Group II, 79.      
27 Working Group II, 79. 
Qualitative State of Knowledge Descriptors 
1. Well- Established – Models incorporate known processes; observations are consistent with 
models; or multiple lines of evidence support the finding. 
2.  Established but Incomplete – Models incorporate most known processes, although some 
parameterizations may not be well tested; observations are somewhat consistent but incomplete; 
current empirical estimates are well founded, but the possibility of changes in governing processes 
over time is considerable; or only one or a few lines of evidence supports the finding. 
3.  Competing Explanations – Different model representations account for different aspects of 
observations or evidence or incorporate different aspects of key processes, leading to competing 
explanations. 
4.  Speculative – Conceptually plausible ideas that haven’t received much attention in the literature 
or that are laced with difficult to reduce uncertainties. 
28 Martin Manning, et al, ed., IPCC Workshop on Describing Scientific Uncertainties in Climate Change to 
Support Analysis of Risk and of Options: Workshop Report (Boulder, CO.: IPCC Working Group I 
Technical Support Unit, 2004), 33. 
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They use the following terms: virtually certain, very likely, likely, medium likelihood, 
very unlikely, and exceptionally unlikely.29 
Despite the implicit uncertainties present in predictions involving the impacts of 
future climate change, there are several predictions that are made with force in the TAR.  
In general, climate sensitivity is likely to range between 1.5-4.5oC between the years 
1990 and 2100.30  These numbers are based on the atmospheric-ocean general circulation 
model (AOGCM), which uses a range of possible emissions scenarios as developed in the 
IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES).31  The TAR also states that all land 
areas will warm more rapidly than the global average, as the global average takes into 
account the warming of the oceans which warm slower than land masses.32  For instance, 
AOGCM scenarios project that winter warming for all high-latitude northern regions will 
exceed the global mean warming by more than 40%.33   Glaciers and ice caps are 
predicted to retreat, while Northern Hemisphere snow cover and sea ice are projected to 
decrease, as well. Global average sea level increases are expected to fall between .11 and 
                                                 
29 Working Group I, 28. 
1. virtually certain – greater than 99% that a result is true 
2. very likely – 90-99% chance 
3. likely – 69-90% chance 
4. medium likelihood – 33-66% chance  
5. unlikely – 10-33% chance 
6. very unlikely – 1-10% chance 
7. exceptionally unlikely – less than 1% chance 
30 Working Group I, 67.  Climate sensitivity is defined as “the equilibrium response of global surface 
temperature to a doubling of equivalent CO2 concentration.”   
31 For more information on the IPCC SRES, see Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 62-63. 
32 Working Group I, 67.   
33 Working Group I, 67. 
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.77 meters. 34  Additionally, carbon dioxide concentrations are predicted to reach 540-970 
ppm by 2100.35  
Further, the TAR projects even more specific impacts with high confidence 
levels.  In Africa, it is predicted that gain yields will decease, affecting overall food 
security.  There is expected to be an increase in droughts, floods, and other extreme 
weather events which will undoubtedly put stress on food and water resources, hinder 
development, and adversely affect human health.  Additionally, scientists predict that 
coastal settlements in Africa will suffer in various ways (higher instances of erosion, 
displacement of people, etc) because of the predicted rise in sea-level.36   
Asia is forecasted to experience an increase in floods, droughts, forest fires, and 
tropical cyclones, especially in the temperate and tropical regions of the continent.  These 
extreme weather events, specifically tropical cyclones and flooding, are expected to 
displace tens of millions of people in the low lying coastal areas of temperate and tropical 
Asia.   Due to the predicted rise in sea level, the ecological security of delicate 
ecosystems, primarily mangroves and coral reefs, will be put at risk.37   
In Australia and New Zealand, water security will be jeopardized because of the 
drying trends that are expected to envelop the region.  Further, animal and plant species 
                                                 
34 Working Group I, 75.  The TAR cites the following contributions to the rise in sea level: 
1. a thermal expansion of .11 - .43 m 
2. a glacier contribution of .01-.23m 
3. a Greenland contribution of -.02 - .09m 
4. an Antarctic contribution of -.17 - .02m 
35 Working Group I, 63.  Uncertainties in this projection cause a variation of -10 - +30%.  Given this 
variation, the total range of carbon dioxide concentration in 2100 is 490 – 1260 ppm.  (Working Group I, 
63.)  
36 Working Group II, 14. 
37 Working Group II, 14. 
14 
with very specific climate niches are expected to become endangered or extinct due to the 
fragile ecosystems in this region that will be negatively affected by climate change.38   
In Europe, decrease in summer runoff, water availability, and soil moisture will 
heavily impact the drought prone southern regions.  In coastal areas, the risks of flooding, 
erosion, and wetland loss are anticipated to increase, consequently affecting human 
settlement, industry, tourism, agriculture, and coastal habitats.  Moreover, biotic zones 
are projected to make a northward shift, resulting in the loss of important natural habitats, 
thereby threatening the livelihood of some species.39   
In Latin America, water supplies will be compromised due to the loss and retreat 
of glaciers.  Droughts and floods are expected to become more frequent, with floods 
increasing sediment deposit, consequently tainting water supplies in some areas.  
Decreases in the yields of important crops are predicted and subsistence farming in some 
regions of Latin America will be threatened. In addition, the rate of biodiversity loss is 
expected to increase for this area.40   
Areas of North America are expected to experience enhanced coastal erosion, 
coastal flooding, loss of coastal wetlands, and an increased risk of storm surges, 
particularly in Florida and large portions of the U.S. Atlantic coastline.  Furthermore, the 
TAR reports that “Climate change in the polar regions is expected to be among the 
largest and most rapid of any region on Earth, and will cause major physical, ecological, 
                                                 
38 Working Group II, 15. 
39 Working Group II, 15. 
40 Working Group II, 15. 
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sociological, and economic impacts, especially in the Arctic, Antarctic Peninsula, and 
Southern Ocean.”41   
Finally, small island states will also suffer many severe effects of climate change.  
The anticipated rise in sea-level will be especially detrimental to these areas.  The 
increase in sea-level is expected to cause enhanced coastal erosion, an increased loss of 
land and property, an increased risk of storm surges, dislocation of people, and an 
increased risk of the loss of coastal ecosystems, and pose a threat to freshwater reserves 
due to the infiltration of sea water.  The agricultural and tourism industries will also 
suffer loses due to the rise in sea-level.42 Moreover, for all the regions described there are 
additional impacts that are predicted with medium confidence.43 
 
Conclusion 
The atmosphere is vital to life (human and nonhuman) on Earth.  However, with 
the onset of the Industrial Revolution, mankind has started to alter one of the fundamental 
functions that the atmosphere provides; specifically, anthropogenic activities have begun 
to intensify the greenhouse effect, consequently resulting in an overall warming of the 
globe.  While there are uncertainties associated with climate science and the impacts that 
climate change will have, many predictions can be made with a very high or high degree 
of certainty.  In sum, anthropogenic induced climate change will have an effect on all life 
forms on the planet, including humans. 
                                                 
41 Working Group II, 16. 
42 Working Group II, 17. 
43 These impacts are detailed in Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel of Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), table SPM-2,  15-17. 
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Chapter II - Empirical Adequacy, Inductive Risk, and Model-Generated Climate 
Predictions 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  In this chapter, I argue that the predictions generated by climate models offer a 
foundation from which to act (to develop policy), even though there are uncertainties 
associated with them. This claim will incorporate both van Fraassen’s idea of empirical 
adequacy and Douglas’s extended conception of inductive risk.   
  In section I, I give a brief explanation of van Fraassen’s account of empirical 
adequacy.  In section II, I offer a general description of general circulation models and 
the problems that are associated with their use.  In section III, I argue that the theories on 
which the general circulation models are based are empirically adequate based on their 
ability to accurately account for past and present climate events.  Continuing, in section 
IV, I argue that Douglas’s conception of inductive risk offers a framework within which 
to consider these predictions.   However, in order to correctly calculate the inductive risk, 
the risk of wrongfully accepting the predictions needs to be considered.  Thus, I consider 
some of the relevant non-epistemic values as well as assess the empirical adequacy of 
economic models.  Finally, I conclude that by coupling the idea of empirical adequacy 
with the idea of inductive risk, it is rational to act on model-generated climate 
predictions.44  
                                                 
44 The term “rational” used in this chapter is simply meant to refer to an action that is based on reason.  The 
use of the term “rational” in this chapter differs from the use in Chapter III, as Rawls gives a very specific 
definition for what is meant by rational. 
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Section I - A Brief Explanation of van Fraassen’s Concept of Empirical Adequacy  
 
 In his work, The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen writes that “Science aims to 
give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a 
belief only that it is empirically adequate.”45  A theory is empirically adequate if what it 
says about observable things is true, and “…such a theory has at least one model that all 
the actual phenomena fit inside.”46  Thus, for van Fraassen, what is counted as an 
observable entity is of extreme importance.  He holds that what is observable is both 
theory-independent and a function of the facts about humans qua organisms in the world.  
Additionally, he explains that “…what counts as an observable phenomenon is a function 
of what the epistemic community is (i.e. observable is observable to us).”47  Elaborating 
on this idea, he explains that science designates what is properly considered observable 
and that the limits of observation cannot be described with finality.  Therefore, for a 
scientist to accept a theory means that he holds that the theory is accurate with regards to 
its account of the observable.48   
Continuing, van Fraassen explains that 
 
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models; and 
secondly, to specify certain parts of these models (the empirical 
substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observable 
phenomena.  The structures which can be described in experimental and 
measurement reports we can call appearances: the theory is empirically 
adequate if it has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to 
empirical substructures of that model.49 
 
                                                 
45 Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 12. 
46 van Fraassen, 12. 
47 van Fraassen, 19. 
48 van Fraassen, 57-9. 
49 van Fraassen, 64. 
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Complete empirical adequacy seems to be an ideal for van Fraassen.  He writes, 
“…empirical adequacy goes far beyond what we can know at any given time.  (All the 
results of measurement are not in; and in any case, we won’t measure everything that can 
be measured.)” 50 This suggests that there can be degrees of empirical adequacy, all of 
which aim towards complete empirical adequacy.  Therefore, for van Fraassen, it seems 
as if in a theory’s “lifetime” it can become more or less empirically adequate depending 
the tools available for measurement and observation; however once measurement or 
observation has been made, then the theory must agree.  To the degree that the theory 
agrees it is empirically adequate. 
 
Section II - General Circulation Models 
  
 The most common types of models used in climate science are general circulation 
models (GCMs).  In general, GCMs are mathematical simulations of climate based on 
physical principles of long-term atmospheric conditions.51   These basic and well-
understood principles provide the foundation of all climate models and include things 
such as theories of the behavior of gases, the radiation absorption and emission 
characteristics of different gases, and turbulent fluid gas flows (defined primarily within 
the field of thermodynamics and other branches of physics).52  These models are used for 
two primary purposes: for predicting future climates, and accounting for causes of change 
in the past.  They incorporate a wide range of complex processes that are attributed to 
                                                 
50 van Fraassen, 69. 
51 Paul N. Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere: Computer Models, Data, and Knowledge About 
Climate Change,” in  Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance, eds. 
Clark A Miller and Paul N. Edwards (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), 37. 
52 Edwards, 35-36. 
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climate change. (These processes include, but are not limited to large scale oceanic 
processes and atmospheric processes and most aspects of terrestrial energy, water, and 
carbon cycles.53)     However, they are currently incapable of simulating some climate 
process directly (often, these processes are not completely understood, and their 
relationship to other known processes are assumed).  For example, currently, the role of 
clouds, some stratospheric processes, the role of humidity/water vapor, and soil moisture 
processes are not accurately represented in models.54    Processes that cannot be 
simulated directly are known as sub grid scale processes.  GCMs start with a few 
empirically derived inputs, such as solar radiation, gas composition of the atmosphere, 
sea surface temperature, and orbital precession.55  The models are then run and the 
simulated climate is compared to long term observed climate trends.   
 Consequently, several problems arise with the use of climate models.  First, due to 
the fact that all the processes still can’t be simulated directly, there are uncertainties with 
regard to how accurate the simulated climates will be.  Additionally, many of the 
predictions that are generated by the models are for hundreds to thousands of years in the 
future.  Therefore, there are obvious difficulties confirming the model outputs. 
 In order to counter these uncertainties, techniques have been developed to 
improve the models.  One such technique is parameterization.   Parameterization seeks to 
represent sub-grid-scale processes in terms of large scale variables.  Thus, a large part of 
the modeler’s job is determining this relationship; Edwards writes, 
                                                 
53 Working Group I, Technical Summary. 
54 Working Group I, Technical Summary. 
55 Edwards, 38-39. 
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 For example, rather than represent cloud formation in terms of convection 
columns, cloud condensation nuclei, and other direct causes, a GCM 
typically calculates the amount of cloud cover within a grid box as some 
function of temperature and humidity.56  
    
If the relationship cannot be determined, modelers are forced to use ad hoc schemes that 
provide the models with the necessary connection.57  Thus, there is a question of how (if 
at all) parameterization affects the overall model results.  Additionally, scientists are 
often forced to tune the parameters.  Tuning the parameters involves “adjusting the values 
and coefficients and even, sometimes, reconstructing equations to produce a better 
overall model result.”58  There are additional problems that arise in tuning, namely the 
tuning (or changing) of one coefficient may necessitate the tuning of other coefficients.  
Thus, changing one coefficient could push other coefficients outside an acceptable 
range.59  
 Despite these uncertainties, climate modelers have been able to make some 
successful predictions.  Specifically, they have been able to develop models that have 
accurately reproduced actual real world phenomena.  This has been shown in their ability 
to replicate past climate changes, and predict present climates with the necessary base 
input.60   The IPCC reports;  
                                                 
56 Edwards, 56. 
57 Edwards, 57. 
58 Edwards, 57.  “‘Better’ may mean that the result agrees more closely with observations, or that it more 
closely corresponds with the modeler’s judgment…” (Edwards, 57.) 
59 Edwards, 57. 
60 Working Group I, Executive Summary and Chapter 7.  For example, some models have been successful 
in predicting and/or simulating  El Niño events (Working Group I, 473), mean atmospheric fields (Working 
Group I, 486), large scale features of the Holocene climate (Working Group I, 496), 20th century climate 
(Working Group I, 498), 20th century global precipitation trends (Working Group I, 498), annual and 
decadal mean near surface palaeo-temperature (Working Group I, 500), extra-tropical storms and storm 
tracks (Working Group I, 508), wind driven-dynamics of the interior of the ocean basins (Working Group I, 
486), Arctic sea ice in the 20th century (Working Group I, 490), and tropical cyclones (Working Group I, 
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Coupled models can provide credible simulations of both the present 
annual mean climate and the climatological seasonal cycle over broad 
continental scales for most variables of interest for climate 
change…Confidence in the ability of models to predict future climates is 
increased by the ability of several models to reproduce the warming trend 
in the 20th century surface air temperature when driven by radiative 
forcing due to increasing greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols.61 
 
 
Section III – The Empirical Adequacy of Model-Tested Theories 
 
   Recall that van Fraassen wrote that “Science aims to give us theories which are 
empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a belief only that it is 
empirically adequate.”62  Moreover, a theory is empirically adequate if what it says about 
observable things about events in the world is true and “…such a theory has at least one 
model that all the actual phenomenon fit inside.”63  When a scientist accepts a theory, he 
considers the theory accurate with regard to the observable.  Recall also that according to 
van Fraassen’s view, what is observable is, in part, a function of what the epistemic 
community designates as observable. Further, observation cannot be described in finality.   
 In the climate science community, a theory of how the climate system works has 
been developed, including how certain forcings affect the natural climate system. This 
theory is composed of a family of structures that van Fraassen calls models.  Within each 
model there is a family of substructures, such as accounts of air and water circulation and 
                                                                                                                                                 
509). (This is not a comprehensive list.)  They are currently not successful (in varying degrees) in 
accounting for clouds (Working Group I, 511), humidity (Working Group I, 511), solar variability 
(Working Group I, 473), western boundary ocean currents (Working Group I, 488), ocean convection 
(Working Group I, 488), ocean eddies (Working Group I, 488), snow mass and cover (Working Group I, 
491),  dynamics of ice sheets (Working Group I, 491), and volcanic aerosols (Working Group I, 473). (This 
is also not a comprehensive list.)  
61 Working Group I, 473. 
62 van Fraassen, 12. 
63 van Fraassen, 12. 
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accounts of atmospheric chemistry and physics (among others).  Parts and combinations 
of these substructures have been deemed as candidates for direct representation by 
observable phenomena; these are the empirical substructures.  In modeling the natural 
climate system (primarily through the use of GCMs), the substructures are accounted for 
and represented by the mathematical formulas that make up the GCM.  The climate 
model is then run and the predictions that result are the appearances (according to van 
Fraassen).  If the appearances (the results of experiment, measurements, etc) are 
isomorphic to the empirical substructures, then the theory can properly be said to be 
empirically adequate.  In other words, if the results of the GCM run match up with actual, 
observable climate phenomenon, then the theory underlying the model can be said to be 
empirically adequate.     
 Recall that climate models are used to account for past climate changes as well as 
to predict future climate changes.  Since the timeline in which future predictions are 
made hundreds to thousands of years in the future, it is often very difficult, if not 
impossible, to compare the predicted results against the actual results.  In other words, in 
the case of future predictions, there is no way of knowing whether or not the appearances 
are the same as, or similar to, the empirical substructures.  Thus, in terms of being able to 
predict future climate, the theories that climate models are based on do not seem to be 
empirically adequate by the standards that van Fraassen has outlined.  In fact, it makes no 
sense to talk about empirical adequacy, since the future, in the present, is not observable.  
Empirical adequacy speaks only to what is observable.    Even though the future 
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predictions cannot yet be deemed empirically adequate, this fact cannot be held against 
GCMs because future predictions say nothing about current empirical adequacy. 
 But what of the aim of predicting past climate changes?   As mentioned above, 
many of the climate models in use today are parameterized to meet the recorded 
conditions and changes of past climates.  In this instance, the modelers know what the 
outcome of their experiment (the model simulated climate) should be; it should 
effectively simulate past climates.  In this sense, the appearances (the model outcome) 
can be compared against the empirical substructures (the past recorded climate).  In the 
instance that the results are not isomorphic, scientists return to the model to parameterize 
and calibrate it so that the appearances and the empirical substructures are in line.  Many 
of today’s models are able to match the outcomes of actual recorded historical climates.64  
Thus, with regards to the aim of accounting for past climate changes, the theories on 
which these climate models are based can be properly called empirically adequate. 
   Taking these two aims together suggests that the predictions of future climate 
change that are generated by climate models will also exhibit the empirical adequacy of 
the theories behind the models, since the same theories are used to predict both past and 
future climates.  Although scientists can’t compare their predictions of the future with 
what actually happens yet, they can test their model (and thus the theory that the model is 
based) by comparing their results to past climates.  If the model output and the past 
recorded results are in line, then the theory can be said to be empirically adequate.  This 
holds even if they can’t compare their predictions for the future with the actual empirical 
                                                 
64 Working Group I, Executive Summary. 
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outcomes.  Presumably, the interactions and relationships that make up the natural 
climate system will remain the same.  Predicting what will happen if one of these 
relations changes can occur only through the use of modeling, since the climate system 
cannot be replicated in a lab.  The theory that drives the models making these predictions 
is the same theory that has been tested through the comparison of model results with 
actual, past climate activities.  
 
Section IV - Inductive Risk and Climate Modeling 
 
 Given the need to predict future climate change (so that policy can be made to 
adapt to and slow down the process), what can be said of theories (and the models that 
represent them) that are empirically adequate to a significant degree, but have not yet 
achieved the ideal of empirical adequacy?  Many have argued that because of the implicit 
uncertainties in such predictions, it is foolish and unnecessary to act on them.65   
However, I hold that this is not the case.  I claim that this problem can be dealt with by 
coupling the idea of inductive risk (proposed by Douglas) with the proven empirical 
adequacy of the theories that drive the models that accurately account for past and present 
climate changes.   
 In the article “Inductive Risk and Values in Science” Heather Douglas argues that 
“…because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in 
                                                 
65 Naomi Oreskes, Kristin Shrader-Frechette, and Kenneth Belitz, “Verification, Validation, and 
Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences,” Science 263 (1994): 641-647.  Naomi Oreskes, 
“Testing Models of Natural Systems: Can It Be Done?,” Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 
Proceedings of the International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 2 (1997): 
207-217.  Steve Rayner, “Prediction and Other Approaches to Climate Change,” in Prediction: Science, 
Decision Making, and the Future of Nature, eds. Daniel Sarewitz, Roger A. Pielke, Jr., and Radford Byerly, 
Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2000): 269-296. 
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science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered.”66   
Expanding on Hempel’s idea of inductive risk, Douglas argues that inductive risk is a 
relevant aspect of the entire scientific process, not just in accepting or rejecting 
hypotheses.  Specifically, there is inductive risk for accepting methodologies, data, and 
interpretations.67  I would like to expand on this idea and add that there are indirect non-
epistemic consequences that should necessarily be considered in taking too seriously, or 
not seriously enough the results of climate model predictions of future climate change.     
 It is commonly accepted that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play 
in the direct application of scientific knowledge in society. However, my point is 
different than this.  First, it is different because we do not yet have scientific knowledge 
(or, for van Fraassen, complete empirical adequacy); rather, all that we have are 
predictions generated by theories that have been shown to be empirically adequate on 
other accounts (accurately predicting past and present climates).   While someday the 
model-generated predictions will be able to be compared to the actual results, and the 
predictions can be confirmed or rejected, that information is not available today.  All that 
there is to go on are predictions that are made by models that have been shown to exhibit 
a high degree of empirical adequacy in their ability to account for past and present 
climate, but not yet for future climate.  Second, the predictions have no direct impact on 
society – there are no direct social or ethical consequences that arise from the predictions 
themselves.  Unlike results of some research programs, these predictions cannot be 
applied to design biological weapons or to make more effective bombs (endeavors that 
                                                 
66 Heather Douglas, “Inductive Risk and Values in Science,” Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): 559. 
67 Douglas, 565. 
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many would agree are unethical on many grounds); they can serve only as guides to 
direct research goals. Predictions alone have no intended or unintended consequences.  
Rather, incorrectly acting (or not acting) on them has unintended consequences.  In other 
words, either wrongfully accepting or wrongfully rejecting the predictions about future 
climate change (and the consequent action or inaction) has unintended consequences.  
The predictions should be used as guides to develop effective policy to slow down 
climate change as well as to adapt to climate change.  On this account of inductive risk, 
scientists have the responsibility of detailing and communicating their predictions and the 
risks associated with their predictions to policymakers.  In turn, policymakers have the 
responsibility of calculating the inductive risk and acting appropriately.68   
In light of the decision at hand (whether or not to risk losing large amounts of 
resources by erroneously adopting climate change mitigation policy or to risk suffering 
potentially disastrous consequences of erroneously choosing not to adopt climate change 
mitigation policy), it is important to investigate what is at stake.  Earlier in chapter I, I 
presented a brief overview of what stands to happen if nothing is done about climate 
                                                 
68 Consider the following example.  In the 1980’s there was growing concern over the effects of CFCs on 
the ozone layer.  While there was uncertainty with regards to whether or not ozone depletion was occurring 
and whether or not it was a result of human activity, the Montreal Protocol was proposed to phase out the 
potentially harmful chemicals. For this situation, calculating the inductive risk (whether or not phase out 
the harmful substances) would look something like the following.  If ozone depletion was not happening, to 
wrongfully sign the treaty may result in the wasting of valuable resources (for example, money spent on 
replacing CFCs).  Conversely, if ozone depletion was occurring, then to rightfully sign the treaty would 
serve to protect the ozone, and consequently protect the biosphere from the resulting harms.  If ozone 
depletion was a reality, then to fail to ratify the Montreal Protocol could result in the degradation of the 
ozone layer, and consequently have disastrous effects on the biosphere.  On the other hand, if ozone 
depletion was not occurring, then not ratifying the protocol would save resources from being squandered on 
a non-existent cause.    So, there is inductive risk in wrongfully accepting and wrongfully rejecting the 
treaty.  The role of the policymakers in this situation is to evaluate and compare the respective risks, 
considering the relevant non-epistemic values.  As history shows, it seems that, all things considered, the 
risk of wrongfully rejecting the protocol was greater than wrongfully accepting the Protocol; it was ratified 
in 1987.  (Daniel Sarewitz, Frontiers of Illusion (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 89-92.) 
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change. Here, I will focus on the other side of the coin – namely, I will investigate what 
lies behind the objection that there is too much to lose by wrongfully (or even rightfully) 
adopting climate change mitigation policy.  First, I will show that since climate change is 
not solely an economic problem, economic considerations should not be the only values 
appealed to.   Second, while there is admitted uncertainty with regards to the projections 
that the IPCC makes, there is even more uncertainty surrounding the economic 
projections.   
 
The Problem of Values 
 
The self-proclaimed Skeptical Environmentalist, Bjørn Lomborg, is probably one 
of the most notable opponents of climate change mitigation policy.  His opposition is 
based solely on the fact that the benefits of climate change abatement policies will be 
enjoyed many years in the future, while the price tag of such action is a burden of the 
present.  According to Lomborg (and other economists) the costs of a climate change 
protection policy will range anywhere from 1.5 to 2 percent of global GDP (this is 
roughly between 480 and 640 billion dollars).69    Lomborg claims that initially it will be 
relatively cheap to make emissions cuts, but it will become progressively more 
expensive.   Thus, the costs of reduction will increase over time; the cost in 2050 will be 
about 2 percent of the OECD countries’ GDP and 4 percent in 2100.70  Additionally, 
Lomborg argues that with time the global GDP is predicted to increase, so the 
consequences of climate change need not elicit worry; 
                                                 
69 Bjørn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 301. 
70 Lomborg, 304. 
28 
Global warming will not decrease food production, it will probably not 
increase storminess or the frequency of hurricanes, it will not increase the 
impact of malaria or indeed cause more deaths.  It is even unlikely that it 
will cause more flood victims, because a much richer world will protect 
itself better.71   
 
He holds that to spend 2 percent of the global GDP on climate change would be foolish, 
and that such money would be better spent on worthier causes.  He concludes, “To put it 
squarely, what matters to our and our children’s future is not primarily decided within the 
IPCC framework, but within the WTO framework.”72  
 Perhaps Lomborg is right –based solely on economic considerations (assuming 
his figures are correct) to choose to take substantial action towards mitigation is 
irrational.  However, to categorize climate change as solely an economic problem is 
erroneous.  Climate change will inevitably have ethical, social, ecological, and 
agricultural effects, among others (see chapters I and III for more detail).  While 
economic considerations are surely important, other values should be taken into 
consideration.  To choose not to do anything about climate change in the present based 
solely on economic considerations is to ignore other important values.  In support of this 
account, Jamieson offers an argument against what he calls the management approach to 
climate change.  The management approach to climate change draws on techniques from 
economic theory for guidance towards policy.  In general, it seeks to manipulate behavior 
by controlling economic incentives.  While Jamieson agrees that economic considerations 
in policy are important, he holds that looking solely to economics for answers is a 
                                                 
71 Lomborg, 317. 
72 Lomborg, 324. 
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mistake.  First, economic efficiency is only one of many values that is important, and 
second, economics tends to generalize human interests.73  He writes; 
It seems plain that people are motivated by a broad range of concerns, 
including concern for family and friends, and religious, moral, and 
political ideals.  And it seems just as plain that people sometimes sacrifice 
their own interests for what they regard to be a greater, sometimes 
impersonal, good…People often act in ways that are contrary to what we 
might predict on narrowly economic grounds, and moreover, they 
sometimes believe that it would be wrong or inappropriate even to take 
economic considerations into account.74 
 
Since human motivations differ from person to person and circumstance to circumstance, 
assuming that all individuals are motivated by self-interest all of the time is fallacious.  
Other values may come into play and should be considered.  In the case of global climate 
change, its effects include more than its economic effects.  Thus, when calculating the 
inductive risk, it is important to consider the effects that climate change will have 
socially, ethically, ecologically, etc.  The inductive risk of adopting climate change 
mitigation policies and not adopting climate change mitigation policies should therefore 
include a consideration of all relevant values; to consider only the economic values 
would leave the calculation incomplete.  For instance, values such as fairness, political 
and social stability, human rights considerations, the ability of a nation to sustain itself, 
national self-determination, biodiversity, and ecological integrity are all values that 
should be considered.  None of these values are represented in economic analysis, and it 
is not clear that they do have a market value. While it is beyond the scope of this project 
to develop and argue for a comprehensive list of values that should be considered, it is 
                                                 
73 Dale Jamieson, “Ethics, Public Policy, and Global Warming.” Science, Technology, and Human Values 
17 (1992): 143-144. 
74 Jamieson, “Ethics, Public Policy, and Global Warming,” 144. 
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not unreasonable to assume that these values are at least equal to or of greater weight 
(when considered together) than only economic values.75   
 How do these values weigh out on either side of the decision at hand?  In chapter 
I, I detailed what stands to happen if climate change goes unchecked; in general, it is 
predicted that there will be global impacts (many of which are predicted to be severe) that 
will be felt socially, politically, and ecologically.  Moving towards climate mitigation 
will also have an effect in some of these areas.  For instance, some societies will be 
forced to adopt more sustainable ways of living, or pay the increased cost of maintaining 
a highly consumptive lifestyle.  Others will be forced to adjust to new taxes, and the 
effects that they will have on the economy.  Depending on the type of abatement that is 
agreed upon, the cost of energy has the potential to increase until greener technologies 
are developed and implemented; this could consequently cause the costs of goods and 
                                                 
75 A complete argument in support of this point is not made because the argument depends largely on the 
moral camp that one is arguing from.  If we accept the fact of moral pluralism, and thus agree that there can 
be competing conceptions of the good, there are going to be different weights given to each value 
depending upon an individual’s moral position.  This will largely affect how one would weight the 
inductive risk calculation.  I don’t think that it is unreasonable to hold that, although there may be 
differences in the weight given to each, arguments can be made from utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue 
ethics theories that there is more that matters than just the financial cost of an action.  Further, while 
mitigation will certainly have impacts environmentally, politically, socially, etc the impacts will be much 
less severe than if we allow climate change to go unchecked.  It is important to keep in mind that there is no 
way to predict the specifics of climate change or of the impacts of mitigation policy.  Thus, it is impossible 
to make an exact list of what the social, environmental, and political effects will be.  What is known now is 
that if climate change goes unchecked, the most impoverished countries will be carrying the greatest 
burdens.  We can expect things like food and water shortage, the spread of disease, dislocation of peoples, 
etc.  Mitigation will put the largest burdens on developed countries because they have to learn how to 
become less dependant on fossil fuels; however we know that there won’t be food and water shortages, the 
spread of disease, and the dislocation of large amounts of people.  If values other than economic values are 
important, then it seems (to me) that we should adopt a policy of mitigation; most would say that the loss of 
human life, severe human rights violations, the destructions of ecosystems, etc cannot be calculated in 
monetary terms, and even if it could it would be inappropriate to do so.   (This argument may still be 
incomplete.  However, it may not be necessary to have an exact weight.  This is true because it can be 
shown that GCMs are more empirically adequate than long-term economic forecasts.  Based on risk 
assessment alone, then, it makes sense to act on the predictions generated from climate models because 
they are more likely to be right.)     
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services to increase in some nations.  However, most of these burdens are likely to fall on 
highly industrialized countries - those countries that will have to make the most 
transitions in order to reduce emissions.  While reducing emissions will certainly be a 
challenge, those nations that will be forced to make the biggest changes are also the 
nations that have the economic and technological resources to effectively adapt to the 
changes that are in order. Additionally, mechanisms can be adopted that will effectively 
lessen the load for industrialized nations, such as emissions trading.   
 As a matter of summary, then, one problem with relying solely on economic 
models is that they fail to take into account other relevant values.  When considering 
some of these values, it is clear that there will be consequences in these areas if climate 
change policy is either wrongfully accepted or wrongfully rejected.  However, it appears 
that wrongfully accepting the policy poses less of a risk since the effects will largely 
occur in those nations that have the best capacity to adapt to them.  Conversely, 
wrongfully rejecting climate change mitigation policy has the potential to cause much 
more severe impacts (socially, politically, and ecologically), largely on those nations with 
low adaptive capacities.76 
 
The Empirical Adequacy of Economic Models  
 In addition to considering other relevant values, it is helpful to examine the 
empirical adequacy of economic models, since there is seemingly so much to lose 
(economically speaking) in wrongfully accepting climate change mitigation policy.  To 
start, there are several problems associated with economic modeling.  Many of the 
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problems that economic models face are due to the fact that they are driven primarily by 
questionable assumptions (in human behavior, market trends, political trends, etc).  These 
problems are inherent with economic analysis, but they are amplified when applied to 
events that will occur tens to hundreds of years in the future.  Consequently, the outputs 
of the model depend upon the assumptions the modelers make and it is often the case that 
models of the same scenario can achieve drastically different outputs.77   
To begin, there are problems with assigning market values to non-market goods, 
such as the costs of species extinction, the loss of biodiversity, and the loss of human life. 
In other words, the loss of non-market goods won’t be considered because they can’t be 
entered into the equation simply because they don’t have a market value; the model fails 
to account for all that we value. In addition, economic analysis tools employ discounting, 
which is based on the assumption that future costs and benefits are worth less than 
present costs and benefits.78  Compounding the problem is the fact future people can’t be 
compensated for irreversible losses.  Additionally, since the specifics surrounding the 
timing, severity, and placement of climate change impacts cannot be known, it becomes 
extremely difficult, if not impossible to predict the costs of such impacts.   
 Moreover, there is also difficulty with the valuation of policies set to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  On this subject, McKibben and Wilcoxen write: 
                                                 
77 For example, “Clinton Administration economists used one eminent macroeconomic model to conclude 
that stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by 2010 would raise the price of a metric ton of 
carbon by $100 – doubling the wholesale price of energy.  Another use of the same model, done for 
industry groups by the consulting firm WEFA Inc., put the increase at $200 per metric ton.”   (Carey, 64) 
78 The use of discounting poses many ethical problems surrounding intergenerational equity.  Specifically, 
it’s not clear that it is entirely fair to count the interests of future people less just because they exist in the 
future.  Undoubtedly, future people will be interested in economic, ecological, social, and political stability 
just as much as present people are.  
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The costs of policies that would limit greenhouse gas emissions are 
highly uncertain.  The reason, in large part, is that baseline emissions are 
very difficult to predict. [Baseline emissions are “the greenhouse gas 
emissions that would occur in the absence of a climate change policy.”79] 
The cost of reducing emissions to a target level depends heavily on how 
much they would have grown otherwise:  the more quickly emissions 
grow in the absence of policy, the larger will be the reductions needed to 
reduce them to a given target.  Not only that, but reductions will have to 
be made a lot sooner, and will hence be more expensive in present value 
terms, when baseline emissions are growing rapidly. 
Many factors affect the baseline path of the world economy:  the 
rates of population growth in different countries; the age structure, 
educational attainment and labour productivity of those populations; the 
rates of productivity growth within individual industries; the rates of 
convergence of developing country incomes and productivity  to the levels 
prevailing in developed countries (or the lack of such convergence); 
OPEC’s production decisions; new developments in the technology of 
fossil fuel extraction; technical progress in conservation and fuel 
efficiency; the discovery of new fuel deposits and reserves; and even the 
degree of social and economic integration between countries.  As a result, 
the economy is very difficult to predict over long spans of time and past 
attempts have been generally far off the mark.  Plausible alternative 
assumptions about these factors can lead to vastly different emissions 
trajectories.80 
 
Not only is the baseline path of the economy and emissions nearly impossible to predict 
in the long-term, but there are further uncertainties in calculating the costs of reducing 
emissions.  First, there are several key economic parameters that are not known precisely: 
short and long-term price elasticities of demand for different fuels; the rate at which the 
consumption of household demands change as income rises; the degree of substitutability 
between products from different countries; the intertemporal elasticity of substitutions ; 
the elasticity of the labor supply; and reasons why more efficient energy supplies have 
                                                 
79 Warwick J. McKibbin, and Peter J. Wilcoxen, “Economic Modeling of Global Climate Change,” in The 
Economics of Climate Change, ed. Anthony D. Owen and Nick Hanley (New York: Routledge, 2004), 189. 
80 McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 175. 
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not been adopted yet.81  Furthermore, there are uncertainties in identifying and 
calculating the indirect benefits of climate change mitigation policy.  For instance, it has 
been speculated that a policy that incorporated a tax on emissions could decrease the need 
for other taxes (because the emissions tax would raise government revenue).   As a result 
of all of the aforementioned uncertainties, the results of economic models differ, even 
when modeling the same scenarios.82  A final uncertainty that cannot be controlled for in 
the economic analysis of climate change is the simple fact that there is no way to predict 
how humans are going to react to the consequences of climate change.  This problem is 
compounded when one takes into account that the exact timing, placement, and severity 
of the impacts are still unknown.  In sum, it is impossible to predict how individuals and 
nations are going to react to the many changes that climate change will instigate, thus, it 
is also impossible to put an accurate price tag on it.     
Given all of these uncertainties, just how reliable are economic forecasts?  Or, in 
other words, are economic models empirically adequate?  Consider the following 
example.  In a recent article in The Wall Street Journal, reporter Justin Lahart detailed a 
survey on the accuracy of economic predictions in the bond market.  He wrote; 
Using quarterly forecasts compiled by the Philadelphia Fed, Mr. Montier 
found that , over the past dozen years, whenever economists have 
predicted that 10-year yields would rise in the following 12 months, they 
have ended up being right only 45% of the time.  Quarter-ahead forecasts 
for rising bond yields are even less accurate – they’re right only 22% of 
the time.83   
 
                                                 
81 McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 175. 
82 McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 175-176. 
83 Justin Lahart, “Ahead of the Tape,” The Wall Street Journal,  24 February 2005, sec. C1. 
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Factors influencing the bond market include the state of the economy, other markets, 
current business trends, and current (or predicted) government policy (especially having 
to do with new taxes), among others.  Of course, the farther into the future a prediction is 
made, the harder it will be to predict the influential trends.  In general though, the bond 
market is a relatively specific market with relatively identifiable variables.  As the 
variables increase, as in the case of predicting the GDP for a given year for the United 
States, projections become even more uncertain.  In fact, economists admit that “their 
models fall far short of simulating something as complex as the U.S. economy.”84    
While there is no way to know (in the present) how accurate the economic models 
surrounding climate change will be, there is good reason to doubt them when taking into 
account the trouble the economists have predicting much smaller, short term economic 
trends.  Some economists have even turned down the task of modeling climate change 
policy, stating that “We couldn’t possibly run something like this through and come up 
with anything meaningful.”85   In general then, it seems as if economic models can 
exhibit some empirical adequacy some of the time (from the example above, 45% and 
22% respectively).  However, as the predictions reach farther into the future, and the 
variables become greater, the empirical adequacy of the models declines greatly, as 
modelers are assuming more about future trends.       
                                                 
84 John Carey, “Greenhouse Gases: The Cost of Cutting Back,” Business Week, 27 December 1997, 64. 
85 Carey, 64. 
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Choosing To Act On Model-Generated Climate Predictions 
  
 Returning to the question at hand – in employing inductive risk, which is it 
rational to choose: the possibility of wasting precious economic resources, or the 
possibility of someday facing the consequences of unchecked global climate change?   
Put another way, should climate change mitigation policy be adopted or rejected, based 
on the predictions put forth by the IPCC?  In the case of climate change, wrongfully 
rejecting the predictions, and thus not developing effective policy, would lead to a global 
ecological catastrophe with severe social and political ramifications (or a complete 
unpreparedness to adapt to the predicted changes).86   Wrongfully accepting the 
predictions and developing policy that is not needed will lead to unnecessary expenses, 
with notable social impacts.  On the other hand, if we accept the predictions and develop 
effective policy, and the predictions are correct, the goal of mitigating and/or adapting to 
the predicted changes will be met. Finally, by correctly rejecting the predictions, and not 
developing policy, we will be no better or worse off.   
 It has been shown that economic models exhibit a lower degree of empirical 
adequacy than GCMs.  Specifically, economic models are unable to reliably predict long-
term economic trends; conversely, GCMs have been shown to accurately predict past and 
present climate changes.   Consequently, it is more likely that  successful predictions will 
be made by models exhibiting a high degree of empirical adequacy than those models 
exhibiting low degrees of empirical adequacy. Additionally, in order to consider all 
necessary non-epistemic values, more than just economic values need to be considered.  
                                                 
86 Working Group II, Summary for Policymakers. 
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Economic models do not account for these other important values, so to make a decision 
just on the output of economic models would be incomplete.  Specifically, as shown in 
chapter I (and developed further in chapter III), unchecked climate change will have 
social, political, and ecological consequences.  While moving towards climate change 
mitigation will also have consequences in these realms, they will be far less severe in 
most instances (since mitigation can be planned).  Thus, by taking into consideration the 
empirical adequacy of both GCMs and economic models, as well as the relevant non-
epistemic values, it seems that the inductive risk of needlessly adopting policy 
(wrongfully accepting the predictions) is less than the inductive risk or wrongfully 
rejecting policy (wrongfully rejecting the predictions).  In other words, all things 
considered, at this point in time it is rational to choose to act on the predictions put forth 
by the IPCC based on what stands to occur if the predictions are wrongfully rejected.   
 
Conclusion 
 
   In conclusion, by coupling the idea of empirical adequacy with the idea of 
inductive risk, it is rational to act on model-generated climate predictions.  Because the 
theories that drive GCMs have been shown to be empirically adequate in their ability to 
account for past and present climate, and these same theories generate future accounts of 
climate events, there is good reason to hold that they will exhibit empirical adequacy on 
this front as well (presuming that the relationships and interactions that account for 
climate change will remain the same).  Despite the fact that these theories have not 
achieved complete empirical adequacy, a framework for considering these predictions 
can be found in Douglas’s conception of inductive risk.  Specifically, by considering the 
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non-epistemic consequences of wrongfully rejecting the predictions vs. wrongfully 
accepting them, it is rational to choose to accept and act on these predictions.  
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Chapter III – Rawls’s The Law of Peoples and Climate Change  
 
Introduction 
 
Since it has been shown that it is rational to act on the model-generated 
predictions associated with climate change, and that this responsibility lies primarily with 
policymakers, a framework from which to deal with these predictions needs to be 
developed.  To this end, this chapter explores the applicability of Rawls’s The Law of 
Peoples to the problem of climate change.  Section I gives a brief summary of Rawls’s 
theory, focusing on those aspects of his work that are most relevant to the problem at 
hand.  Section II details how climate change can threaten the well-orderedness  of just or 
decent peoples, in at least three distinct ways:  by threatening the ability of societies to 
meet their human rights requirements, by threatening the necessary public and political 
infrastructures, and finally by infringing on the abilities of just and decent regimes to 
meet their respective, distinct requirements.  In these instances, the duty of assistance can 
be extended to protect the well-orderedness of those peoples in danger.  Section III 
details an alternative Rawlsian route to dealing with the problem of climate change.  
Namely, it may be the case that behind the veil ignorance, parties will agree to a ninth 
principle to be added to the Law of Peoples that will address the problem of externalities.  
Finally, section IV deals with the problem of free riders and climate change.  This section 
details how, as a last resort, strict measures of coercion can be taken against those 
peoples that threaten the well-orderedness of other peoples by refusing to act on their 
duty to assist.  I conclude that the framework that Rawls offers in The Law of Peoples is 
able to adequately deal with the problem of climate change.     
40 
Section I - Summary of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples 
 
In The Law of Peoples John Rawls outlines his principles and norms for 
international law.87  The Law of Peoples applies to the Society of Peoples which Rawls 
defines as “all those peoples who follow the ideals and principles of the Law of Peoples 
in their mutual relations.”88  To be a member of the Society of Peoples a nation must have 
either a constitutional liberal democracy or a non-liberal, but decent, form of 
constitutional and republican government.  Rawls writes that the aim of the Law of 
Peoples is to realize the establishment of all societies into either of the above-mentioned 
regimes.    
  To arrive at the principles to govern the relations of the Society of Peoples, Rawls 
employs two original position arguments.  The first is set at the domestic level. In this 
original position, members of the same society are choosing the principles of justice that 
will regulate their society; representatives are to agree on fair terms of cooperation that 
                                                 
87 Rawls writes that the Law of Peoples refers to a “particular political conception of right and justice that 
applies to the principles and norms of international law.” (John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 3. 
88 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 3.  Rawls stresses the categorization of peoples above states because peoples 
can act for moral reasons and can be held morally accountable.  One of the features of a liberal democratic 
people is a moral nature which allows them to establish fair terms of cooperation with others.  Further, for 
Rawls, peoples lack traditional sovereignty and this distinguishes them as entities distinct from states.    
Additionally, the character of  a peoples is different from the character of the state.  Liberal peoples define 
their interests according to the reasonable, allowing it to be stable for the right reasons.  Conversely, the 
interests of the state are based on the rational, and therefore do not allow for it to be stable for the right 
reasons.  Despite this distinction, Rawls is very clear as to what the roles of national boundaries are.  He 
explains that “unless a definitive agent is given responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the loss for 
not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate.  In this case, the asset is the people’s territory and its capacity 
to support them in perpetuity; and the agent is the people themselves as politically organized.” (Rawls, The 
Law of Peoples, 38)  The government’s role is to be a responsible steward of the peoples’ territory, 
including maintaining the environmental integrity of the territory.  If a government fails to do this, it cannot 
correct its error by conquest of, or migration into, another peoples’ territory.  
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will be used to govern the basic structure of society.89  Hence, the political conception of 
justice that will be agreed upon is the one that is both reasonable and rational and has the 
best reasons in support of it.   
In the second original position, the liberal conception of justice that was chosen in 
the first original position will be extended to the Law of Peoples; this process occurs at 
the international level between members of separate, but equal, liberal, democratic 
regimes in which parties choose between different formulations of the principles of the 
Law of Peoples.90    Again, the parties are represented as rational and are represented 
symmetrically (therefore fairly).  Each representative in the original position represents 
only one people as a corporate body and seeks to protect the fundamental interests of this 
people.   These interests include political independence and civil liberties, the peoples’ 
security, territory, and well-being and self-respect.  The principles that would be agreed 
upon would be the following (or versions of the following): 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence 
are to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of 
war. 
                                                 
89 There are five features of the original position that Rawls describes as essential: “(1) the original position 
models the parties as representing the citizens fairly; (2) it models them as rational; and (3) it models them 
as selecting from among available principles of justice that apply to the appropriate subject, in this case the 
basic structure.  In addition, (4) the parties are modeled as making these selections for the appropriate 
reasons, and (5) as selecting to reasons as related to the fundamental interests of citizens as reasonable and 
rational.” (Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 30-31.) 
90 The second original position also is subject to the five essential features as outlined in footnote 68. 
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8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living unfavorable 
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social 
regime.91 
 
The above principles are recognized as principles of political conduct that will govern the 
members of the Society of Peoples; they constitute the fundamental charter of the Law of 
Peoples.  Together, they dictate ways of forming and regulating associations of peoples 
as well as standards of fairness in trade and cooperation. 
  All members of the Society of Peoples need not be liberal peoples. Here the role 
of toleration emerges.  Rawls explains that to tolerate means  
…not only to refrain from exercising political sanctions – military, 
economic, or diplomatic – to make a people change its ways.  To tolerate 
also means to recognize these non-liberal societies as equal participating 
members in good standing in the Society of Peoples, with certain rights 
and obligations, including the duty of civility requiring that they offer 
other peoples public reasons appropriate to the Society of Peoples for their 
actions.92  
 
Rawls holds that liberal peoples must cooperate and assist all other peoples in good 
standing, including decent peoples.  Decent peoples are those non-liberal peoples whose 
basic institutions of society live up to specified standards of political right and justice.  
Additionally, these peoples must be able to justify a reasonable and just law for the 
Society of Peoples.   
 Rawls also addresses the problem of burdened societies in the global community.  
He defines burdened societies as societies that “while they are not expansive or 
aggressive, lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, 
                                                 
91 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 37. 
92 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 59.   
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and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be well ordered.”93   Well-
ordered societies have a duty to assist burdened societies (in line with principle eight of 
the Law of Peoples).  Rawls points out that even if a society is not wealthy, it can still be 
a well-ordered society.  Thus, while acting on their duty of assistance, the aim for all 
parties involved, is to “realize and preserve just institutions, and not simply to increase, 
much less maximize indefinitely, the average level of wealth, or the wealth of any society 
or any particular class in society.”94  The aim of the duty of assistance is to move 
burdened societies into the Society of Peoples; this is the target of the duty of assistance 
and assistance can cease once the target has been reached. 
 
Section II - Climate Change and the Well-Orderedness of Just and Decent Peoples 
 
Rawls’s eighth principle for The Law of Peoples states, “Peoples have a duty to 
assist other peoples living in unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or 
decent political and social regime.”95  Further, Rawls describes the goal of the Law of 
Peoples as the establishment of all societies into either a liberal or decent regime.  With 
this aim in mind, it would presumably be the case that the eighth principle could be 
extended to include a duty of assistance to those peoples that are in danger of 
experiencing unfavorable conditions that would severely jeopardize, or even destroy, the 
just or decent regime of an individual society.  In other words, if the aim of the Law of 
Peoples is the establishment of just or decent societies, then it follows that there should 
be a duty to assist those societies that are in danger of having such regimes compromised.  
                                                 
93 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 106. 
94 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 107. 
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 Thus, the question of whether or not global climate change would create the 
aforementioned conditions needs to be addressed. I contend that global climate will lead 
to conditions that will threaten the well-orderedness of just or decent societies in at least 
three distinct ways.  First, climate change will leave some societies unable to meet their 
human rights requirements.  Second, climate change will render some societies unable to 
maintain the right sort of public political infrastructure and political culture. Additionally, 
the predicted effects of climate change will leave some peoples unable to meet the further 
requirements of well-ordered liberal democratic societies or well-decent societies. 
 
Climate change and Human Rights: Will climate change leave any society unable to 
meet its human rights requirements? 
 
 Rawls explains that human rights “set a necessary, though not sufficient, standard 
for the decency of domestic political and social institutions.”96  Rawls explains that these 
rights include; 
…the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to 
freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient 
measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and 
thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as 
expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be 
treated similarly).97 
 
In addition, Rawls cites some articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) that may be included in his conception of human rights; specifically, he cites 
Articles 3 to 18.  The rights mentioned in the UDHR include the rights to life, liberty, and 
security; freedom from slavery; the right to freedom from torture and degrading 
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treatment; the right to recognition before the law; the right to nondiscrimination and 
equal protection before the law; the right to an effective remedy for an act violating 
fundamental rights; the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile; the 
right to a fair and public hearing to determine the rights and obligations of criminal 
charges; the right to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty; the right to 
freedom from arbitrary interference; the right to freedom of movement and residence; the 
right to asylum; the right to a nationality; the right to refuse marriage; the right to 
property; and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.98   In short, these 
are necessary conditions for any form of social cooperation, and are requirements for 
well-orderedness in just and decent regimes.  Thus, if they are directly infringed upon, or 
if society’s ability to pursue these rights is infringed upon, then the well-orderedness of 
that society is threatened.   
 Of all the rights listed above, it is presumably the case that climate change will 
have the potential to at least affect the ability of a people to maintain and pursue the right 
to subsistence.  In the paper “Political Authority and Human Rights,” author David Reidy 
writes, 
But when Rawls focuses directly on the basic human rights possessed by 
individual persons, he interprets the right to subsistence as a right to a 
‘minimum economic security’ including ‘general all-purpose economic 
means’ sufficient to make ‘sensible and rational use’ of the liberties 
afforded within one’s own domestic political order…A more charitable 
reading, then, would have Rawls committed to a basic human right to a 
substantial economic and social minimum relative to the decent or liberal 
democratic domestic order to which one belongs, a minimum (in all cases 
except perhaps the atypical case of an isolated and primitive indigenous 
                                                 
98 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  < http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (27 May 2005). 
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people) beyond what typically comes to mind when one thinks of mere 
subsistence.99 
 
Thus, at minimum, is appears that any substantial threat to economic, food, or water 
security would pose a threat on the ability of a peoples to maintain and pursue the right to 
subsistence,  and possibly pose a threat to the well-orderedness of the society.  The well-
orderedness of a society would be threatened in those instances when a people’s 
resources are degraded to such a degree that, even with trade it is no longer viable, or a 
people is left with nothing to trade in order to secure its necessities.       
 Does climate change pose a substantial threat to economic, food, and/or water 
security?  The IPCC reports that climate change does indeed pose such a threat.    They 
write that “the vulnerability of these systems varies with geographic location, time, and 
social, economic, and environmental conditions.”100  In general, as a result of the increase 
in temperature, water availability is expected to be reduced in those countries that are 
already water-stressed.  Additionally, sea-level rise will lead to the contamination of 
freshwater sources of many coastal nations and small island states.101   Food and 
agricultural security will also be threatened.  The IPCC writes, 
…assessments indicate that yields in some crops in tropical locations 
would decrease generally with even minimal increases in temperature, 
because such crops are near their maximum temperature tolerance and 
dryland/rainfed agriculture predominates.  Where there is also a large 
decrease in rainfall, tropical crop yields would be even more adversely 
affected…Most studies indicate that global mean annual temperature 
increases of a few °C or greater would prompt food prices to increase due 
                                                 
99 David Reidy, “Political Authority and Human Rights,” in A Realistic Utopia: Essays on Rawls’s “The 
Law of Peoples,” eds. Rex Martin and David Reidy (Blackwell, 2005 forthcoming), 5. 
100 Working Group II, 5. 
101 Working Group II, 9, 14-17.  Additionally, the IPCC specifically cites that parts of Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, and small islands states are expected to experience a decrease in water security and supply. 
(Working Group II, 14-17)  
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to a slowing in the expansion of global food supply relative to growth in 
global food demand (established, but incomplete)…studies find that 
climate change would lower incomes of vulnerable populations and 
increase the absolute number of people at risk of hunger…102 
 
Specifically, those most vulnerable to diminishing food and agricultural security include 
peoples in Africa, parts of Asia, and on some small island states.103   
  Thus, it appears that climate change will affect the ability of some peoples to 
internally secure and pursue the right to subsistence.  That is, the ability of some peoples 
to maintain an acceptable social minimum, in accord with Rawls’s interpretation of the 
right to subsistence, will be diminished. (I will discuss economic security below.) 
Consequently, the well-orderedness of some peoples will be threatened if, even with trade 
they are left unviable, or if the country is left with nothing to trade in order to secure its 
resources.  In these instances, the duty to assist is triggered.104 
 
Climate Change and the Public Political Infrastructure: Will climate change leave any 
society unable to sustain the right sort of public political infrastructure, or solidarity in 
political culture? 
 
 Rawls points out that citizens of a liberal and decent societies are regarded as 
having the two moral powers – “a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a 
conception of the good.”105  The role of the principles of justice is to “protect citizens’ 
higher-order interests; they are guaranteed within the framework of the liberal 
constitution and the basic structure of society.”106  In order for the body of citizens to 
                                                 
102 Working Group II, 10-11. 
103 Working Group II, 14-17. 
104 It may be the case that one way to fulfill the duty of assistance is to open trade with nations that are 
susceptible to the criteria described above. 
105 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 92. 
106 Rawls, The Law of People, 92. 
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exercise and develop these two moral powers, the right type of constitution and basic 
structure need to be in place.  In general, these requirements demand a secure economy 
and a rule of law, as well as the preservation of those things that give a people its identity 
as a people.  Therefore, the ability of climate change to affect these systems needs to be 
explored.      
 
Small Islands States and Economic Stability 
 One way in which climate change could affect the systems necessary for the basic 
structure of a well-ordered peoples is by destroying or severely debilitating a people’s 
economy.  The IPCC reports that “The economic sectors that support the [human] 
settlement are affected because of changes in resource productivity or changes in market 
demand for the goods and services produced there.”107  In addition, “Settlements with 
little economic diversification and where a high percentage of incomes derive from 
climate-sensitive primary resource industries (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) are 
more vulnerable than more diversified settlements (high confidence).”108 
 While all countries are expected to feel the impact of climate change on their 
economies, small island states are predicted to experience the worst affects.109  On this 
matter, the IPCC reports 
                                                 
107 Working Group II, 12.  
108 Working Group II, 13.  Also noteworthy is that with the increase in the severity and incidence of severe 
weather predicted with climate change, the costs of insurance will also rise.  The IPCC reports that “Such 
changes would trigger increased insurance costs, slow the expansion of financial services into developing 
countries, reduce the availability of insurance for spreading risk, and increase the demand for government-
funded compensation following natural disasters.” (Working Group II, 13.) 
109 Working Group II, 14-17.  Among others, the IPCC lists the following effects:  In Asia, “Climate 
change would increase energy demand, decrease tourism attraction, and influence transportation in some 
regions of Asia (medium confidence).”  (Working Group II, 14.) Additionally, “Poleward movement of the 
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The projected sea-level rise of 5 mm yr -1 for the next 100 years would 
cause enhanced coastal erosion, loss of land and property, dislocation of 
land and people, increased risk from storm surges, reduced resilience of 
coastal ecosystem, saltwater intrusion into freshwater resources, and high 
resource costs to respond to and adapt to these changes (high 
confidence)…Limited arable land and soil salinization makes agriculture 
of small island states, both for domestic food production and cash crop 
exports, highly vulnerable to climate change (high confidence)…Tourism, 
an important source of income and foreign exchange for many islands, 
would face severe disruption from climate change and sea-level rise (high 
confidence).110  
 
The effect that climate change will have on tourism on these areas is of great concern.  
The IPCC reports that these islands will suffer both direct and indirect effects in this area; 
for instance, the loss of beaches and degraded coastal ecosystems (as a result of sea level 
rise), coupled with the warmer winters that are projected for the developed countries of 
the north may leave these destinations less attractive.  A further concern related to 
tourism is that it is a major source of employment in many of these areas; for example, 
this industry represents 70% of the labor force in the Bahamas and 40% in Malta.111   
Thus, any impact that climate change has on tourism, will affect the job opportunities and 
well-being of the laborers in these areas. 
 Small islands are also less likely to be able to adapt to the effects of climate 
change due to their small physical sizes, limited natural resources, relative isolation, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
southern boundary  of the permafrost zones in Asia would result in a change of thermokarst and thermal 
erosion with negative impacts on social infrastructure and industries (medium confidence).” (Working 
Group II, 14.)  In Europe “River flood hazard will increase across much of Europe (medium to high 
confidence); in coastal areas the risk of flooding, erosion, and wetland loss will increase substantially with 
implications for human settlement, industry, tourism, agriculture, and coastal natural habitats.” (Working 
Group II, 15.)  In Latin America, “Coastal settlements, productive activities, infrastructure, and mangrove 
ecosystems would be negatively affected by sea-level rise (medium confidence).  (Working Group II, 15.)  
In North America, “Weather-related insured losses and public sector disaster relief payments in North 
America have been increasing; insurance sector planning has not yet systematically included climate 
change information, so there is potential for surprise (high confidence). (Working Group II, 16.)   
110 Working Group II, 17. 
111 Working Group II, 862. 
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openness of their small economies that are very sensitive to external shocks and natural 
disasters, undeveloped infrastructures, and limited funds and skills.112  The IPCC explains 
that while small islands states contribute less than 1% of the global GHG emissions, they 
are the most vulnerable to the consequences; even if a global effort (the Kyoto Protocol) 
was adopted, it would be too late to make a significant difference for small island states – 
“Therefore, climate change impacts are inevitable.”113   
 In general, climate change has the potential to affect the economies of almost all 
nations, but its most severe effects will be borne by those peoples that do not have the 
capacity to effectively adapt.  Small islands states are especially vulnerable, and the 
impacts that climate change will have on these nations’ economies will certainly threaten 
the well-orderedness of these peoples, since climate change embodies the potential to 
debilitate or completely destroy these peoples’ economies.  Thus, in those cases where 
the stability of the economy will be substantially affected by climate change, and 
consequently affect the ability of a well-ordered society to remain as such, the duty of 
assistance is triggered.    
 
Climate Change and Cultural Threats 
 Rawls writes, “…it is surely, ceteris paribus, a good for individuals and 
associations to be attached to their particular culture and to take part in its common 
public and civic life.”114  To unnecessarily infringe on a people’s culture is to 
unnecessarily infringe on their right to self-determination. With the predicted effects of 
                                                 
112 Working Group II, 60. 
113 Working Group II, 854-855. 
114 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 61. 
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climate change, many peoples are going to be forced to change the ways that they live, 
and abandon priceless aspects of their culture.  However, some of these impacts are going 
to be harsher on certain populations than they are on others.   Some peoples stand to lose 
ecosystems that are considered national treasures, while others are going to have to give 
up the traditions of their ancestors, and still others are going to lose invaluable symbols of 
spirituality and history.  In what follows, I will offer a few examples in support of this 
claim, but it is important to note that this is far from a comprehensive list. 
  To begin, climate change is predicted to lead to the destruction or severe 
impairment of ecosystems that some people depend on for their cultural and spiritual 
livelihood.  This is especially true in parts of Latin America.  The local people inhabiting 
parts of this region have strong ties to the land, both aesthetically and spiritually.115  The 
IPCC writes that an increase in sea level “could affect monuments and historic sites of 
Central America.”116  Indigenous peoples in the polar regions are also very susceptible to 
the consequences of climate change.  In these regions, “Harvesting [of fish] contributes to 
community cohesion and self-esteem, and knowledge of wildlife and the environment 
strengthens social relationships.”117  With the onset of climate change, the increase in 
temperature, sea-level rise, and coastal erosion the range and abundance of keystone (for 
the people) marine and terrestrial animals will be threatened; “At minimum, salmon, 
herring, walrus, seals, whales, caribou, moose, and various species of waterfowl are 
likely to undergo shifts in range and abundance.  This will entail local adjustments in 
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harvest strategies as well as in allocations of labor and resources.”118  Additionally, 
changes in the seasons experienced in this region will also have profound effects on the 
inhabitants.  Consider the following; 
For example, when sea-ice is late in forming, certain forms of hunting are 
delayed or may not take place at all.  When sea ice in the spring melts or 
deteriorates too rapidly, it greatly decreases the length of the hunting 
season.  Many traditional foods are dried (e.g., walrus, whale, seal, fish, 
and birds) in the spring and summer to preserve them for consumption 
over the long winter months.  When the air is too damp and wet during the 
“dying” seasons, food becomes moldy and sour.  The length of the wet 
season also affects the ability to gather greens such as willow trees, beach 
greens, dock, and wild celery.119 
 
In sum, “‘the combination of alternative cultural lifestyles and altered subsistence 
opportunities resulting from a warmer climate may pose the greatest threat of all to the 
continuity of indigenous cultures in northern North America.’”120   
 A final example of a threatened culture lies in the peoples that inhabit small 
islands states.  Again, this culture is a risk of losing much of its subsistence and 
traditional skills and knowledge, its community structure, and its villages and 
settlements.121   Already 
Sea-level rise and climate changes, coupled with environmental changes 
have destroyed some very important and unique cultural and spiritual 
sites, coastal protected areas, and traditional heritage sites in the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Niue, and Kiribati, and 
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continue to threaten others…In Tuvalu, for instance, strong traditional ties 
to land and sea constitute a vital component of local cosmology.122 
 
 The effects of climate change will have an impact on many cultures around the 
world, but some are more severely threatened by others.  As of now, many of the most 
negative effects are still avoidable, and for those that are inevitable, there is still enough 
time to prepare for them.  Since for Rawls a peoples’ culture is part of its self-identity and 
self-respect, to infringe upon on a peoples’ culture in a way that is both negative and 
avoidable is to infringe upon their right to self-determination.  Additionally, a peoples’ 
self-identity and their ability for self-determination are imperative for a society to become 
and remain well-ordered.  Thus, any negative, avoidable threat to the self-identity or 
(unnecessary) threat to the self-determination of a peoples threatens the well-orderedness 
of a peoples; climate change poses such a threat.  Therefore, the duty of assistance is 
triggered.   
 
Climate Change and the Further Requirements of Well-Oderedness:  Will climate 
change affect the ability of liberal societies to meet their respective requirements of 
well-orderedness? 
  
 Rawls writes that liberal peoples, while rational, are constrained by the 
reasonable.123  This moral nature, in order to achieve stability for the right reasons, must 
be sustained from one generation to the next.  These reasonable interests allow peoples to 
attain stability for the right reasons.  Rawls explains, “Stability for the right reasons 
describes a situation in which, over the course of time, citizens acquire a sense of justice 
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that inclines them not only to accept but to act upon the principles of justice.”124  For 
Rawls, a reasonably just constitutional democratic society meets three characteristic 
principles: 
the first enumerates basic rights and liberties of the kind familiar from a 
constitutional regime; 
the second assigns these rights, liberties, and opportunities a special 
priority, especially with respect to the claims of the general good and 
perfectionism values; and 
the third assures for all citizens the requisite primary goods to enable them 
to make intelligent and effective use of their freedoms.125 
 
Rawls explains that the third principle requires certain types of institutions and 
arrangements if a regime is to achieve stability for the right reasons: 
(a) A certain fair equality of opportunity, especially in education and training.  
(Otherwise, all parts of society cannot take part in the debates of public 
reason or contribute to social and economic policies.) 
(b) A decent distribution of income and wealth meeting the third condition of 
liberalism: all citizens must be assured the all-purpose means necessary 
for them to take intelligent and effective advantage of their basic 
freedoms. (In the absence of this condition, those with wealth and income 
tend to dominate those with less and increasingly to control political 
power in their own favor.) 
(c) Society as employer of last resort through general or local government, or 
other social and economic policies.  (The lack of a sense of long-term 
security and of the opportunity for meaningful work and occupation is 
destructive not only for citizen’s self-respect, but of their sense that they 
are members of society and not simply caught in it.) 
(d) Basic health care assured for all citizens. 
(e) Public financing of elections and ways of assuring the availability of 
public information on maters of policy.  (A statement for the need for 
these arrangements merely hints at what is needed both to ensure that 
representatives and other officials are sufficiently independent of 
particular social and economic interests and to provide the knowledge and 
information upon which policies can be formed and intelligently assessed 
by citizens.)126  
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These requirements will serve to help protect the basic liberties and will help to prevent 
excessive inequalities.  Thus, the question must be asked, will the effects of climate 
change have the potential to threaten these requirements and/or the three principles of a 
just democratic society.   
 To begin, it is worth noting that it has already been shown that climate change has 
the potential to affect the ability of a people to meet its human rights requirements as well 
as its ability to sustain the right sort of public political infrastructure (as seen in the 
possibility that climate change will effect both the stability of economies and the self-
identity of some peoples).  If these requirements cannot be met, it would be very difficult, 
if not impossible, to meet the further requirements of a well-ordered democratic society.  
Nonetheless, it is worth exploring this possibility. 
  Depending on the relative wealth of a people (and therefore their adaptive 
capacities), climate change may in fact have a profound impact on the ability of a society 
to meet the aforementioned requirements.127  Climate change is going to demand lifestyle 
changes to reduce the impacts of climate change, or as a result of the impacts of climate 
change.  The costs of maintaining food security, water security, dealing with new health 
issues, and/or preparing for and recovering from weather events may create a  burden that 
can not be overcome, while at the same time maintaining the requisite structures for a just 
democratic society.  For example, the IPCC reports, “It is established, though 
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orderedness.  Of additional note is the fact that many of the most susceptible societies to the effects of 
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a society is, the more easily it will be able to adapt, and the safer it will be from losing its well-orderedness. 
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incompletely, that climate change, mainly through increased extremes and 
temporal/spatial shifts will worsen food security in Africa.”128  Additionally,  
Adaptive capacity of human systems in Africa is low due to lack of 
economic resources and technology, and vulnerability high as a result of 
heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture, frequent droughts and floods, and 
poverty….Grain yields are expected to decrease for many scenarios, 
diminishing food security, particularly in small food-importing countries 
(medium to high confidence)…Increases in droughts, floods, and other 
extreme events would add to stresses on water resources, food security, 
human health, and infrastructures, and would constrain development in 
Africa (high confidence).129 
 
If there exists a country in Africa that is well-ordered and meets the aforementioned 
criteria, but is susceptible to the problems described above, then it may be that its status 
as a well-ordered, liberal society is in jeopardy.  The characteristics and principles that 
Rawls offers above are in place so as to ensure that all citizens can remain free and equal, 
politically speaking.  In order for this to occur, and as reflected above, the society must 
be able to sustain a decent social minimum for all its citizens.  Rawls describes this 
minimum, “This covers at least the basic needs essential to a decent life, and presumably 
more.”130  This foundation is needed to secure the idea of political equality and self-
respect in citizens.  A citizen lacking in the basic needs will be politically withdrawn 
from society, and will be more likely to see himself as inferior to his fellow citizens.  
Rawls describes the social bases of self respect as “essential if citizens are to have a 
lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their own ends with self-
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confidence.”131  If, for example, food or basic health care is only available to wealthier 
citizens then the equality and self-respect of citizens cannot be assured.  In general, the 
severity of impacts that a society may face, coupled with its ability to adapt to these 
impacts may affect the ability of a society to maintain the equality (and perhaps other 
requirements) of all its citizens.       
 Thus, it seems to be the case that in some well-ordered, democratic countries 
climate change may infringe upon their abilities to maintain the equality of their citizens.  
If this is the case, then climate change can actually threaten the well-orderedness of some 
democratic regimes.  Thus, again, the duty of assistance is triggered. 
 
Climate Change and the Further Requirements of Well-Orderedness: Will climate 
change affect the ability of decent societies to meet their respective requirements of 
well-orderedness? 
 
For Rawls, a non-liberal society is decent if its “basic institutions meet certain 
specified conditions of political right and justice and lead its people to honor a reasonable 
and just law for the Society of Peoples.”132    One condition for such a society is that it 
must secure the human rights of all its members, including  
the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to 
freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient 
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measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and 
thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as 
expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be 
treated similarly).133   
 
The rights and liberties outlined above are needed in order to secure that persons can 
meet their duties and obligations, as well as be and remain cooperating members of 
society.134  Second, the law of the decent people must be such that it imposes “bona fide 
moral duties and obligations (distinct from human rights) on all persons within the 
people’s territory.”135   
 While it has already been shown that climate change may affect a society’s ability 
to meet its human right requirements, a decent society may also be in jeopardy if it 
cannot provide its citizens with those resources necessary for them to meet their duties 
and obligations and to remain cooperating members of society. As in the case with liberal 
societies, things such as food and water security are some of the resources necessary to 
sustain this standard.  Those countries that are susceptible to the severe impacts of 
climate change but do not have the wealth or resources to adapt are the nations that are 
most in jeopardy.  The IPCC reports that countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and 
small island states will experience threats to their water and/or food security.  
Additionally, it is in these same areas that the IPCC reports as having the least adaptive 
capacity due to things such as lack of economic resources and technology, climate 
sensitive agriculture, and small economies. 136  In these areas, it may be that the well-
orderedness of some peoples may be threatened because the background resources that 
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are necessary to sustain such a society is threatened.  Therefore, the duty to assist is again 
triggered.  
 In addition, even if these resources are sustained to a minimum degree, a decent 
society also demands a certain type of public political infrastructure along with the rule of 
law.137  While these societies need not be liberal, they must remain non-authoritarian.  In 
those cases when the background resources are in serious shortage, the rule of law and 
the right sort of public political infrastructure will likely be left unstable.  In some 
instances it may be that they degrade entirely.  In these instances, the duty to assist is 
triggered.    
 Finally, decent societies, unlike liberal societies may have a national religion or 
conception of the good.  As a matter of self-determination, a decent society ought to be 
allowed to pursue its chosen religion or conception of the good.  Of course, this ability 
may be threatened by the impacts of global climate change in any of the ways previously 
mentioned.  If the ability of a nation to pursue its conception of the good is threatened, 
the to duty assist may be triggered. 
 
The Duty to Assist 
Thus, it is clear that global climate change will affect the ability of some decent 
and some liberal societies to remain as such.  Recall that Rawls’s duty to assist states: 
“Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.”138  Further, the aim of 
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the Law of Peoples is the establishment of all societies into either a liberal or decent 
regime.  With this aim in mind, the duty to assist could be proactively invoked to protect 
those peoples that are in danger of experiencing unfavorable conditions that would 
severely jeopardize, or even destroy, the ability of a society to remain well-ordered.  
(However, Rawls himself never discusses such a possibility.)  In other words, if the aim 
of the Law of Peoples is the establishment of just or decent societies, then it follows that 
there should be a duty to assist those societies that are in danger of having such regimes 
compromised. Additionally, all members of the Society of Peoples are obligated by the 
duty to assist, not just those members who are most responsible for the damage, and not 
just the wealthiest societies.  (However, the amount of wealth a society has can limit its 
contributions.)   
So, how then can Rawls’s duty to assist be extended to deal with this problem?  
Presumably, there are two important steps that should be taken.  First, there is a duty to 
slow down or stop those processes that are causing the harm.  Namely, those practices 
that have lead to climate change need to be refined in such a way that they create no or 
little threat.  Further, there is a duty to help those countries that will suffer the 
consequences of climate change adapt to the changes that will inevitably occur as a result 
of global climate change.  Since climate change is a global problem, brought on by each 
member of the human race (admittedly, some societies have contributed more damage 
than others), the solution needs to be one that adequately and fairly deals with these facts.  
In general, the solution must be one that encompasses the participation and cooperation 
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of all countries, especially those countries that have been shown to contribute the most to 
the problem at hand.  
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls writes that in the second original position peoples 
will “formulate guidelines for setting up cooperative organizations and agree to standards 
of fairness for trade as well as certain provisions for mutual assistance.”139  Presumably, 
then, in the Society of Peoples, an agreement that dealt with the problem of climate 
change could be formed.  Additionally, it is important to note that for Rawls, the 
principles that constitutes the charter of the Law of Peoples include, “Peoples are to 
observe treaties and undertakings,” and “Peoples are equal and are parties to the 
agreements that bind them.”140 Thus, once an agreement has been reached the parties to 
the agreement (in this case, the whole of the Society of Peoples) would be bound to live 
up to the agreement.141    
 
Section III - An Alternative Rawlsian Route to Dealing With the Problem of Climate 
Change 
  
 While extending the duty to assist is one viable way for dealing with the problem 
of climate change within the Rawlsian framework, there may be another; namely, behind 
the original position representatives may agree on a ninth principle that deals with the 
problem of externalities.  One reason to be concerned with externalities would be issues 
of fairness.  Specifically, it would presumably be unfair to force country A to bear the 
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costs of country B’s action, while only B enjoys the benefits of such action. A second 
reason that agents may be concerned with externalities has to do with efficiency; in other 
words, aside from questions of fairness, externalities pose the risk of inefficiency.  In 
those instances where externalized costs are greater than the internalized gains the 
behavior poses the risk of being a leach on social utility and cooperation, rather than a 
contributor to it.  
Recall that the second original position is set up to extend a liberal conception of 
justice to the Law of Peoples; that is, they are deliberating over the content of the Law of 
Peoples.  The parties are restricted by a veil of ignorance that protects them from 
knowledge of the size of the territory inhabited by those that they represent, the 
population of those they represent, the strength of those that they represent, the 
availability of natural resources in the territory, the level of economic development, and 
other such information.  They do know that there are conditions that make a democratic 
society favorable. The representatives are to secure the interests of the parties that they 
represent.  Rawls writes, “Thus, they strive to protect their political independence and 
their free culture with its civil liberties, to guarantee their security, territory, and the well-
being of its citizens.”142   In addition, Rawls states a further interest – that of amour-
propre.  Rawls explains “…this interest shows itself in a people’s insisting on receiving 
from other peoples a proper respect and recognition of their equality.”143  Behind the veil 
of ignorance, the peoples are regarded as being equal, reasonable, and rational; thus, all 
are prepared to offer and accept fair terms of social and political cooperation.    Rawls 
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writes, “These fair terms are those that a people sincerely believes other equal peoples 
might accept also; and should they do so, a people will honor the terms it has proposed 
even in those cases where a people might profit from violating them.”144  In short, this is 
a criterion of reciprocity.    Under these conditions, Rawls was led to the eight principles 
that serve as the charter for the Society of Peoples.  The principles agreed upon rest on a 
foundation of equality and equal rights for all peoples and all satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity.  Under the same conditions, with the same interests in mind, it would 
presumably be the case that the representatives would agree on a ninth principle:  Peoples 
have a duty to internalize externalities that threaten the ability of other peoples to 
maintain territorial integrity. 
Like the original eight principles, the proposed ninth principle would meet the 
criteria of reciprocity and equality.  With regards to reciprocity, this principle could be 
sincerely proposed and could be reasonably accepted by others “without submitting to a 
position of inferiority or domination.”145   In other words, it is based on reasons that all 
behind the veil of ignorance could accept. These reasons are properly based on political 
values (efficiency and fairness), and thus are reasons that all can accept; they are not 
based on some particular comprehensive doctrine of the good or the like.   Additionally, 
the ninth principle meets the baseline of equality because it preserves the equality and 
equal rights of all people by preventing one people from unfairly imposing themselves 
and their damaging byproducts on another people. Consequently, by adopting such a 
principle the representatives in the original position would serve to protect the 
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fundamental interests of the parties that they represent.  Specifically, this principle would 
protect the territory and well-being of represented peoples by either prohibiting harmful 
externalities, or demanding adequate compensation for harmful externalities.  This 
principle would also serve to protect the self-respect of the people.  For example, a nation 
that is subject to the harmful pollution of another country could come to see itself (and be 
seen by the world) as a dumping ground for unwanted byproducts.  Such a nation would 
no longer be viewed as an equal, and would not be able to exercise its right of self-
determination.  146   
 
Evaluative Criteria for Realizing the Principle 
 The issue of identifying a proper procedure or mechanism for realizing this 
principle in the real world is beyond the scope of this project.  However, there are certain 
criteria that any procedure or mechanism should meet.  Presumably, the same criteria that 
led to the agreement of the ninth principle (behind the veil of ignorance) should be the 
standard that the realization of the principle should meet.  Thus, any procedure that is 
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adopted to deal with the internalization of harmful externalities should be fair, it should 
protect the fundamental interests of the members of the Society of Peoples, it should 
recognize all peoples as equals, and it should contain an element of mutuality.  In 
addition, any such procedure should be concerned with economic efficiency; because, 
presumably, behind the original position, representatives will not only want to agree on 
principles of trade that are free and fair, but also ones that maximize social benefits.  
These criteria would lead to the adoption of a mechanism that was both fair and accepted 
for the best reasons (reasons that all could agree to).     
 A fair mechanism for the specific case of climate change would be one that 
fairly allocated emissions quotas (or in other words, offered a fair distribution of the 
global atmosphere).  This issue is perhaps the most fundamental issue that needs to be 
addressed, for it will set parameters for the other criteria and will establish the playing 
field for future interactions.  In other words, establishing who has rights to what (a right 
to pollute vs. a right to clean air, etc) is foundational.  As a baseline, it seems clear that at 
minimum, each people has a right to the commons to the extent that is needed to support 
its own well-orderedness.  This share cannot be sold or traded (within the Rawlsian 
framework I have developed); if the aim of the Law of Peoples is the establishment of all 
societies into just or decent regimes, then all societies must retain at least their minimum 
share of the atmospheric commons that is needed to remain well-ordered.  On the other 
hand, no people has a right to harm or destroy the territory of another people.  Since well-
orderedness is a fundamental interest shared by all peoples, the amount of the 
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atmospheric commons that is necessary for well-orderedness cannot be infringed upon by 
another or used by another society.   
 Beyond this initial distribution, though, it’s not so clear how the remainder of 
the commons (presuming there is a leftover) should be distributed.  As Singer proposes, 
there are various ways to divide the atmosphere: according to past offenses, according to 
population at either present or future levels, according to economic activity, or according 
to energy needs (this could be a function of standard of living, geography, level of 
industrialization, etc).147  While I don’t claim to have a definitive answer to this, there is 
something to be said for the proposal that Singer himself endorses:  allocate quotas 
according to “equal per capita future entitlements to a share of the capacity of the 
atmospheric sink, tied to the current United Nations projections of population growth per 
country in 2050.”148   In other words, whatever is leftover in the pie after the initial 
distribution should be divided according to equal per capita allocations (of a global 
emissions cap) based on the estimated population for some fixed year in the future.  As 
Singer points out, this method gives incentive to keep a nation’s population down; the 
smaller the population is at the target year, the greater the allocation is per capita.  This 
type of distribution embodies the idea that each individual has an equal share to the 
global commons, regardless of what nation he is from, and protects nations from having 
to pay for offenses that they did not know that they were committing.  Further, it allows 
developing nations the much needed room to grow; that is, their claim on the atmosphere 
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will not be diminished because they are not yet industrialized, rather they will be given 
the leeway to move towards industrialization.           
 Moreover, such a procedure would have to respect the fundamental interests of 
all the peoples of the Society of Peoples as specified behind the veil of ignorance; in 
general, these interests include the protection of a peoples’ political independence as well 
as the protection of its security, territory, and well-being of its citizens, and the 
preservation of its self-respect and self-determination.  Thus, no procedure could be 
adopted that unfairly favored the interests of one people over another.  Further, as all 
members of the Society of Peoples are equals, all should be treated as such; Rawls writes, 
“Well-ordered peoples insist on equality among themselves as peoples…”149  In general 
then, no such procedure should be adopted that forced one people to suffer undue 
hardships for the benefit of another people.  Any mechanism adopted should also contain 
an element of mutuality.  That is, the chosen procedure should be one that,  “… a people 
sincerely believes other equal peoples might accept also; and should they do so, a people 
will honor the terms it has proposed even in those cases where a people might profit from 
violating them.”150  Contained in this idea of mutuality is the ability of all peoples to 
agree on the procedure without having to submit to a position of inferiority.  The reasons 
appealed to in support of such principles should be properly political; that is, for example, 
a certain religious doctrine, on its own, does not offer good reasons for others to accept or 
reject any given mechanism.   
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 The final criterion that any mechanism must meet is that of economic 
efficiency, which is concerned with maximizing the social benefit of instituting the 
principle, constrained by the criteria that trade should be both free and fair. Since 
externalities pose the risk of inefficiency, any mechanism that was instituted to deal with 
the problem of externalities should be concerned with efficiency. Again, here the 
importance of a fair distribution of initial rights is highlighted.  It is imperative that, from 
the start, rights are assigned that establish either the right to pollute or the right to be free 
from pollution.  These rights will establish the initial bargaining positions; from these 
positions individuals/peoples can deal with each other depending upon how much they 
value the right to pollute and the right to be free of pollution.  One such way to ensure 
this type of efficiency is to use the global market.  In this setting, participants can bargain 
to the most efficient outcome.  Simply put, within the market setting, participants can sell 
or purchase their rights as they see fit; the outcome will be the most efficient outcome 
(that which maximizes social utility).  Employing the use of the global market also helps 
to ensure that any people that is subjected to another people’s externalities will do so 
voluntarily (fairly).  That is, the offending people will have to purchase another people’s 
right to be free from harmful externalities.151   
                                                 
151 This line of argumentation is based primarily on the Coase Theorem.  The Coase Theorem states: 
“In a well-functioning market, individuals trade with one another in ways that benefit all concerned.  These 
exchanges are Pareto superior or Pareto improving (barring adverse third-party effects).  In  a perfect or 
idealized market, such exchanges occur until no further mutually advantageous exchanges can be made.  
(Jules L Coleman, Jules L., “Law, economic approach to,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed. E. 
Craig  (London: Routledge 1998). <http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/T015SECT2> (23 May 2005).)”   
Essential to this theory is the assignment of property rights, as they define the initial bargaining positions; if 
property rights are uncertain, then successful exchange becomes jeopardized.  So, in the case of climate 
change it is important to assign rights to the atmospheric commons.  Additionally, there must be a market 
in which the transactions may occur.  This means that there needs to be some sort of global emissions 
trading, in which countries that want or need more emissions quotas could purchase these rights from other 
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 As a matter of summary, then, any mechanism that is established to realize the 
ninth principle should meet a certain set of criteria.  First, the procedure should be fair.  
Thus, it needs to be decided what a fair allocation of the global atmosphere would be.  
Additionally, the procedure should protect the fundamental interests of the members of 
the Society of Peoples and should recognize each member as an equal.  Consequently, the 
mechanism should fairly consider the interests of all peoples and no people should be 
forced to adopt undue hardships for the benefit of another.  Next, the procedure should 
embody an element of mutuality; that is, is should be a procedure that can be accepted by 
other equal peoples.  Finally, the mechanism should be concerned with efficiency.  
Therefore, it should seek to maximize the social benefit within the limits of free and fair 
trade. 
 
Section IV - Free Riding and Climate Change 
 
  Working from Rawls’s account of ideal theory, a direct application of the eight 
principles (and the proposed ninth) leads towards collective action and treaty-making as 
                                                                                                                                                 
countries that did not want or need them.  According to Coase, these transactions would continue until the 
most efficient allocation was reached – such an allocation would distribute emissions quotas to the societies 
that needed them until the costs of quotas become such that they outweighed the benefits of emitting, while 
at the same time distributing the monetary value of the quotas to the less emitting countries until these 
benefits were outweighed by the costs of giving up their right to emit/their right to be free from pollution.  
Coase argues that in perfect market situations, the social costs of one’s actions – “the external effects; 
effects of one person’s conduct or consumption on the welfare of others” – will be internalized.  (Jules 
Coleman and Jeffrie Murphy, eds. Philosophy of Law (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 187.) 
So, for the case at hand, the damage done by harmful green house gas emissions will be 
internalized by putting a price on the right to emit, the sum of which will be paid to the country that would 
have otherwise suffered from the damaging externalities. (Of course, there are some shortcomings to this 
theory.  First, this theory assumes that there will be zero transaction costs.  Additionally, market correction 
of inefficiencies is dependant upon the transaction being allowed.  So, in order to correct for the externality 
of GHG, there must be rules that allow for such transactions. Also, there could be problems in agreeing to a 
fair initial distribution of property rights.   Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, hold-out behavior can 
decrease the possibility of ending up at the most efficient allocation.  That is, this theory is dependant upon 
individuals acting cooperatively.  (Andrew Altman.  Arguing About Law, 2nd ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth 
Publishing, 2001), 181-183.) 
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ways to deal with the problem of climate change (as a coordinated extension of the duty 
of assistance).  Unfortunately, this leaves the door open for the opportunity to free ride. In 
other words, peoples that do not participate in collective action or treaty making, and thus 
don’t bear the costs of such actions, can still reap the benefits. His account of ideal theory 
states that as members of the Society of Peoples, peoples ought to live up to their duty of 
assistance.  Thus, any collective action that is taken as an extension of this duty should be 
honored by all members of the Society of Peoples.  With regards to climate change, it is 
presumably the case that any free rider (especially one as large and damaging as the 
United States) could compromise the effectiveness of collective action, if that people is 
not undertaking a unilateral plan to fulfill their duty of assistance.  In such cases, 
economic and diplomatic sanctions may be justified.  Measures such as these may in fact 
motivate a people into compliance.  But, what if they don’t work?   Unfortunately, 
Rawls’s theory does not offer any direction to dealing with the problem of free riders 
beyond this point.  However, it may be the case that there is a solution to the problem of 
free riders in the instance of climate change and situations like it.  Specifically, based on 
the predictions that climate change will threaten the ability of some peoples to remain 
well-ordered, coupled with the fact that a people has a right to war in self-defense, as a 
very last resort, coercion (possibly in the form of military intervention) may be justified 
on those peoples that are not cooperating, that are significant contributors to the problem, 
and, at the same time, are not taking any unilateral efforts to fulfill their duty of 
assistance.152   
                                                 
152 At this point, it may be helpful to distinguish between at least two important issues.  The first is the issue 
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To begin, it is worth noting that it may be the case that a people has reasonable 
objections to the proposed actions of the Society of Peoples.  Such objections are 
extensions of a people’s reasonable interests. Rawls defines the reasonable interests of a 
liberal people in the following manner: 
They seek to protect their territory, to ensure the security and safety of 
their citizens, and to preserve their free political institutions and the 
liberties and free culture of their civil society.  Beyond these interests, a 
liberal people tries to assure reasonable justice for all its citizens and for 
all peoples…153 
 
Thus, in any treaty making or collective action situation, it may be that a people may 
have reasonable objections to the proposed treaty or collective action.  However, there 
are limits that are placed on these interests.    Rawls states clearly that “…no people has 
the right to self-determination, or a right to secession at the expense of subjugating 
another people.”154   As an example of such a violation, Rawls cites the South’s attempt 
to secede in the late 1860s.  He claims that such action was unjustified since it was doing 
so to perpetuate the institution of slavery, an institution that was based on severe human 
                                                                                                                                                 
of free riders, defined by one party enjoying the benefits of collective action, but refusing to participate in 
collective action.  The second issue is related to, but can be distinguished from free riding.  Namely, it may 
be the case that a would-be free rider refusing to participate in collective action can completely negate the 
actions of the other parties.  That is, the benefit of collective action can never be realized because of the 
actions of the would-be free rider.  (In this instance, it would be incorrect to deem the nonparticipating 
party a free rider because there would be no benefits on which to free ride.)  It is arguably the case that both 
situations should be treated in the same manner.  Specifically, both free-riders and would be free-riders, in 
the instances where the duty to assist is triggered to protect the well-orderedness  of a people, should be 
(first) subject to economic and diplomatic sanctions and/or (second) military intervention if they refuse to 
act on this obligation.  However, as noted above, refusing to participate in collective action does not, in and 
of itself, justify sanctions or military intervention.   The people has a duty of assistance whether or not it 
participates in collective action.  Thus, sanctions and military intervention can only be justified when a 
peoples has first refused to participate in collective action and has also failed to undertake any unilateral 
action to sufficiently fulfill its duty, and when the total benefits of such action would outweigh the costs. 
153 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 29. 
154 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 38. 
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rights violations.155  While not as overt or direct as slavery, the effects of climate change 
will violate human rights standards and threaten the well-orderedness of many peoples.  
Thus, the largest and most damaging emitters cannot appeal to their right to a free culture 
or self-determination since such rights (in this case) are dependant upon the subjugation 
of other peoples.    
 It still may be the case that a people can have a reasonable objection to the action 
or treaty proposed by the Society of Peoples.  However, it does not seem that such an 
objection could free a people from its duty of assistance, although it may free a people 
from a particular treaty or proposed action; the Law of Peoples is binding on all members 
of the Society of Peoples.  If a people has legitimate, reasonable objections to such 
actions, it has a duty to engage in unilateral actions that will adequately satisfy their duty 
of assistance. Failure to meet this obligation would effectively render a nation an outlaw 
state. 
Outlaw states are those regimes that refuse to comply with a reasonable Law of 
Peoples.156  However, Rawls limits his discussion of such states to those societies that 
wage war on other societies to advance their own rational interests.  Rawls writes that 
well-ordered peoples have a right to war only as a matter of self-defense.  He explains 
“To trespass on citizens’ liberty by conscription, or other such practices in raising armed 
forces, may only be done on a liberal political conception for the sake of liberty itself, 
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that is, as necessary to defend liberal democratic institutions and civil society’s many 
religious and nonreligious traditions and forms of life.”157   
 At this point, I extend Rawls’s idea, arguing that self defense may require going 
to war with countries that are well-ordered, but fail to comply with the list of principles 
that constitute the Law of Peoples. Such an action may in fact be “…for the sake of 
liberty itself, that is, as necessary to defend liberal democratic institutions and civil 
society’s many religious and nonreligious traditions and forms of life.”158  Further, this 
action is only justified when a people’s territory, basic structure, and organizations 
supporting human rights are endangered (in short, when its well-orderedness is 
threatened).  If a people fails to act on its duty to assist, and their actions threaten the 
well-orderedness of other peoples, then strict forms of coercion can be justified only with 
the failure of economic and political sanctions, and only when the total benefits of 
intervention would exceed the total costs.      
I hold that strict forms of coercion may be the only answer, but such an action is 
to be used only as a last resort, when the total benefits of the action will outweigh the 
total costs, and only when the consequences of the offending society threaten the well-
orderedness of other peoples or make it impossible for other peoples to maintain 
territorial integrity in perpetuity.  In the case of climate change, peoples that are 
significant emitters of greenhouse gases that refuse to participate in collective action 
while at the same time refusing to embark on unilateral efforts to fulfill their duty of 
assistance are effectively attacking those peoples that will most severely suffer the 
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consequences of climate change.  Thus, as a matter of self-defense, military action can be 
taken against the offender.  Such action would be necessary only until the offending 
country was forced into compliance or agreed to comply. 
The objection may be raised that allowing for such actions would violate Rawls’s 
conception of tolerance.  Included in this idea is the requirement of a liberal society to 
respect the diverse comprehensive doctrines of its citizens (within limits) and, 
internationally, that a liberal society tolerate nonliberal societies that meet certain 
standards of political right and justice, while leading its people to a respect and adhere to 
a reasonable Law of Peoples.  However, it may be the case that while a society is liberal 
internally – it is well-ordered and respects the comprehensive doctrines of its citizens – it 
may not be adhere to the Law of Peoples.  That is, there could be a democratic country 
that acts on its rational interests rather than on reasonable terms.  Should such a nation be 
tolerated when its actions threaten the well-orderedness of other societies?  If military 
action is allowed when an outlaw state has violated the human rights of is own citizens or 
as “… necessary to defend liberal democratic institutions and civil society’s many 
religious and nonreligious traditions and forms of life,” then it should be allowed when a 
state is violating the human rights of other nation’s citizens or when a state is 
jeopardizing the well-orderedness of other societies.159  
While the infringement on well-orderedness resulting from climate change is less 
than overt and will likely take years to come into full effect, the strictest forms of 
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coercion may seem severe and unreasonable.  However, the nature of climate change is 
that emissions today will cause damage many years from now.    Rawls writes, 
As I see the point of the institution of property is that, unless a definitive 
agent is given responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the loss for 
not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate.  In this case, the asset is the 
people’s territory and its capacity to support them in perpetuity; and the 
agent themselves as politically organized.  As I noted in the Introduction, 
they are to recognize that they cannot make up for their irresponsibility in 
caring for their land and its natural resources by conquest of war or by 
migrating into other  people’s territory without their consent.160 
 
The environmental damage that will likely be caused by climate change will, in many 
instances, limit the ability of some well-ordered peoples to support themselves in 
perpetuity, and in this way may also threaten well-orderedness.  It is the government’s 
responsibility to make sure that its people’s land is cared for and that its natural resources 
are managed wisely.  If a government is careless with these responsibilities, then war 
with, or expansion into, other countries cannot be justified.   However, it may not be the 
case that territorial degradation is the fault of the government; territorial degradation may 
occur because of uncontrollable and unpredictable natural disasters, or, as is the case with 
climate change, it may occur because of the actions of other peoples (in this case, the 
irresponsible use of fossil fuels).  In the latter case, it seems that if the offending people is 
not willing to change its ways, to engage in collective action to rectify the problem, or to 
live up to its duty to assist, and it can be shown that its actions are either (or both) 
threatening the well-orderedness of a people, or infringing on the ability of a people to 
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maintain its territorial integrity in perpetuity, then strict forms of coercion may be 
justified.161  
 In sum, while Rawls does not directly deal with the problem of free riders beyond 
the point of political and economic sanctions, his theory can be extended to ground strict 
forms of coercion (possibly military intervention) against offending peoples on the basis 
of self-defense.  Specifically, climate change will threaten the ability of peoples to remain 
well-ordered.  Peoples that are emitting damaging amounts of greenhouse gases, while 
simultaneously refusing to act on their duty to assist, are, in a way, attacking the peoples 
that will suffer the worst consequences of climate change.  On this basis, military actions 
can be taken against offending countries as a form of self-defense, but only as a last 
resort.    
 
Conclusion 
  
In this section, I explored the applicability of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples to the 
problem of climate change.  It has been shown that climate change has the potential to 
affect the well-orderedness of just and decent regimes.  Thus, the duty to assist can be 
extended to protect those peoples that are the subjects of such threats.  Additionally, I 
have shown that behind the veil of ignorance, parties in the original position would agree 
                                                 
161  Here, it is worth noting that coercion may only be justified when the actions of a people directly 
threaten the well-orderedness of another (and refuse to change), or if the inactions of a people threaten the 
well-orderedness of a people (For example, the United States refusing to participate in collective action to 
combat climate change while simultaneously not undertaking any program to live up to their duty of 
assistance.).  Thus, not all free riders can properly be the subjects of  coercion or military intervention.  
Additionally, coercion or military intervention for the case of climate change may need to be taken 
proactively if  a people is threatening the well-orderedness of another by refusing to adopt any measures 
towards abatement.  Or, it may also be justified after the damage has been done, and a people is not willing 
to act on its duty to assist to help repair the damage that it has contributed to.  
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to a ninth principle.  Specifically, representatives would agree to a principle that would 
fairly address the problem of externalities.   Finally, I showed that Rawls’s theory is also 
equipped to deal with the problem of free riders in the case of climate change.  Namely, 
as a matter of self-defense, coercion (possibly in the form of military intervention) can be 
taken against an offending peoples who refuse to act on their duty of assistance and 
whose actions threaten the well-orderedness of other peoples.   In conclusion, Rawls’s 
theory as espoused in The Law of Peoples is able to adequately deal with the problem of 
climate change. 
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Conclusion 
 While there is much hype surrounding the problem of climate change on the 
international front, this problem has yet to receive the attention that it rightly deserves.  In 
general, many policymakers cite the uncertainties surrounding climate change predictions 
as reasons not yet to act; additionally, some leaders are unwilling to commit to carrying 
their nation’s fair share of the burden.   In this paper, I have attempted to reframe the 
problem of climate change.  In sum, I have argued that it is rational for policymakers to 
act on the model-generated predictions surrounding climate change and that the 
framework that Rawls details in The Law of Peoples is a viable option for dealing with 
this problem.  In conclusion, not only is it rational to act on the model-generated 
predictions of climate change, but (working within Rawls’s framework) failure to 
adequately do so would be a failure to act on one’s duty to assist.   
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